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ARRESTS AS GUILT
Anna Robert?
An arestputs a halt to one'sfree if and my act as prlude to a new process. That new processprosecution- nay culminate in afinding ofgd& But arest andguilt-conceptsthat arefactuay and
kgaly distinct-frquent# sem to beflued together This fusion ppars in -any of the consequenes
of amst,including the use of arrtsin assessing 'Wsk " in calculting "readiwesm," and in identiytng
"offnders."An examination of thisftson eucidates obstades to key aspecs of criminajusiereforma.
Efforts at reform, whetherfocused on proseaw'on or dfense, poie or bud require a robust understanding of the differences between arrestand guilt; if thg run counter to an ipkdtfiaion of the two, they
d/1 inevitablyfalter.
INTRODUCTION

Approximately eleven million arrests are made in this country per year.'
2
Some arrests lead to prosecutions, some do not; some prosecutions lead to
3
convictions, some do not. Some arrests-let us assume-correspond to
4
crime commission, some do not. Thus, an arrest does not connote legal guilt
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1. See 2016 Crime in th UniAd Staw, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
(ast visited Mar. 13,
https://ucr.fbigov/cdme-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-ts.-2016/tables/table-l8
2019).
and the FourthAmmawt, 59 MD. L REV. 1, 3(2000) C"[1]n
Withot Prwo
2. Surell Brady, Arrto
a number of large jurisdictions, the majority of criminal cases at the state level, both misdemeanora and
felonies, are dismissed without prosecution.").
3. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManaxerialJuticeand Mass Misdmemors, 66 STAN. L REV. 611, 649
(2014) ("Approximately half of misdemeanor case dispositions in 2012 were convictions."); Sandra G.
Mayson, Dangerous D/indatr,127 YALE LJ. 490, 562 (2018) ('One-third of arrests lead to dismissal or
acquittaL").
4. See infra Subpart IA.
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or factual guilt, nor is it supposed to. It is supposed merely to be supported by
"probable cause," a standard that is relatively low5 and that does not require
an adjudication of guilt. 6 This standard is applied on the assumption that
7
things like exculpatory information and defenses are for a later time.
And yet, in a wide range of ways, in a wide range of contexts, and in the
assumptions of a wide range of people, arrests appear to be fused with guilt.
The stage that is supposed to lie between arrest and adjudication-that period
of diligent investigation, zealous representation, exploration of defenses, and
possible dismissal-has too often collapsed in our implicit, and sometimes
explicit, understandings of the criminal legal system. This fusion appears in
consequences of arrest; discussions of "recidivism" and assessments of "risk"
that seem to treat an arrest as equivalent to guilt; and linguistic and statistical
"slips" that confuse "offenders" with arrestees and "crimes" with alleged
crimes.
Given the many differences-factual and legal-between arrest and guilt,
such a fusion demands explanation and critique. In addition, its potential consequences need to be identified and resisted.
Part I lays out key ways in which arrests are distinct from guilt, whether
factual guilt (commission of the crime charged) or legal guilt (conviction for
the crime charged). Part II identifies a number of manifestations of an apparent fusion of arrest and guilt. Part III explores how the fusion of arrest and
guilt might have come about, discussing the influences of plea-bargaining,
diversionary programs, and media, as well as the desire to comfort ourselves
that our criminal legal system makes sense and does justice-or at least isn't
unjust nonsense.
Part IV identifies one crucial set of reasons why such a fusion matters. Vital reform of the criminal legal system relies on a robust understanding of the

5. Se Kenneth J. Melilli, Pr0e=oria1DirscaOxin aisAdimwy Syxw, 1992 BYU L REV. 669, 680-81
("Probable cause is little more than heightened suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to screen

out individuals who are factually not guilty."); Alexandra Natapoff, Mirdwxazof, 85 S.CAL L REV. 1313,
1349 (2012) (describing probable cause as "a standard which demands less than a preponderance of the
evidence, and which 'means less than evidence which would justify condemnation"' (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983))); id ("[A]n innocent person can be legally arrested, sail through the weak
screening processes of the prosecutorial and public defender offices, go to jail, and succumb to the pressure
to plead guilty, all based on no more than a probability (less than a fifty-fifty chance) of guilt. Itis precisely
by rolling hack the evidentiary checking mechanisms which ensure both accuracy and transparency that the
system effectively permits criminal convictions on such thin bases."); William Ortman, Pombabk Cause Raisitea 68 STAN. L REV. 511, 559 (2016) ("Probable cause to arrest...
. 'does not require the fine resolution of
conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt orawn apr pondram starxdgd emor.' While some states use a
stricter formulation of probable cause, many others accord with federal law. When a 1981 survey of judges
asked respondents to reduce 'probable cause' to a specific probability, moreover, the average was 45.78%."
(footnote omitted) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,121 (1975))).
6. Se Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989); Natapoff, swa note 5, at 1349 (describing the probable cause standard as requiring "less than a fifty-fifty chance of guilt").

7. Se Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting the idea that "an officer must
have proof of each element of a crime and negate any defense before an arrest").
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difference between arrest and guilt. If this distinction has indeed collapsed,
even for those committed to criminal justice reform, an array of perhaps otherwise puzzling failures of reform-in areas that include defense representation, prosecutorial conduct, police conduct, and preadjudication sufferingmay make more sense. Exposing this fusion is a necessary first step toward a
new stage of reform.8
I. ARRESTS # GUILT
Whether one is concerned primarily with "factual guilt" or with "legal
guilt," an arrest is, of course, quite distinct from guilt. While definitions of
both "factual" and legal" guilt are myriad, 9 this Part lays out a working definition of each, before discussing the multiple ways in which each differs from
arrest.
A.

Arrests

FactualGult

While alternative definitions will be discussed below,10 this Article describes someone as "factually guilty" regarding Crime X if she committed
Crime X 1 In other words, to be factually guilty of Crime X, each of the elements of Crime X must be satisfied (including actus mu and mens rea requirements), and there must be no defense that negates guilt.12 While selecting this
definition removes some complications, 13 it leaves one large one. Since there
is sometimes no definitive answer to the question "Did she commit the
crime?", it will sometimes be impossible to resolve the question of factual
guilt. 14 For example, there may be no definitive answer to the question of

8.

For scholarly neglect of arrests, see Eisha Jain, Amto at Reijatio, 67 STAN. L REV. 809, 814

(2015) (noting that arrests "remain surprisingly understudied').
70 IOWA L REV. 27, 44 (1984)
9. See David L Shapiro, Shomd a GAOyv Pha Have Prwhai Effisd,
(describing the distinction as "a very controversial one").
10. Seexfi Subpart MI.C
as the Bauisfor
O
11. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Bea '!awt? The Ch/i refBiw
PantadRihts, 66 N.Y.U. L REV. 353, 362 n.28 (1991) ('Mhe term 'guilty' is used to denote both individuals
who have committed a crime, whether or not they are convicted-this is 'factual guilt--and those who
are convicted of a crime, even if they did not in fact commit the crime-qgal guilt."').
12. See, eag.,Shapiro, ssm note 9, at 44 ("For me, factual guilt embraces the questions whether the
accused committed the acts with which he is charged and whether he committed them with the requisite
mens rea and without legal justification.").
13. See hfra Part I.B.
14. Or, as John Mitchell puts it, "[t]here are cases where factual and legal guilt merge. You may
know all the facts in a self-defense case, but whether the defendant was 'reasonable' or not in employing
the force he did will be a conclusion of the trier of fact. On the other hand, whether he was 'reasonable'
will be central to the question of his factual guilt." The EAia of th Cmi,a Defere Attokn-Ne Amwn to
Old .Qwtio, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297 n.12 (1980); sm alro Gary Goodpaster, On the Thewy vfAe emn
ia 78J. Ckim. L & CRIIONOLOGY 118, 130 (1987) ("Mhe kind of historical fact with
isaTr
Adeea7y CO
which the law is concerned may not even exist in any meaningful way independent of the method of
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*whether someone was "reasonable" in using force in self-defense.15 This caveat does not alter the fact that there are several reasons why an arrest does not
equal factual guilt.
First, an arrest is at its core a governmental act, rather than the act of a
suspect;16 its occurrence, therefore, cannot in and of itself establish that a suspect is guilty of anything.1 7 (Of course, an arrest is generally claimed to be
made in rsponse to a suspect's act, but that is a different thing.) While this point
may seem obvious, that it needs to be made is suggested by the many contexts-discussed below' 8 -in which an arrest is portrayed as the act of a suspect.
Second, even if we view an arrest as a response to a suspect's alleged act,
an act is rarely sufficient to establish factual guilt. 19 Recall that factual guilt is
defined here as commission of a crime, and recall that in our legal system
crimes generally require, in addition to particular acts (or omissions), other
elements such as mental states,2M and also require the absence of successful
defenses. An arrest may speak to law enforcement's assertion vis-i-vis an alleged act (and allegations about alleged acts may suffice to establish probable
cause), 21 but that falls far short of a demonstration of factual guilt.22

proof."); id at 133 ("IThere is no truth regarding criminal liability indepeadmt of the truth determined at
trial, and trials are more truth-producing than truth-finding events."); Shapiro, Apra note 9, at 44 ("[S]uch
matters as state of mind are so subjective and ephemeral that it is hard to speak of a reality distinct from the
finding of the trier of fact.'; Note, Costs andthe Pka BaY~ah Promr. Redawig the Prie ofJsdi t &eNonixdioWit Dqfxnd= 89 YALE LJ. 333, 348 n.85 (1979) ("Frequently it is impossible for either the defendant or his
lawyer to know before the trial whether the defendant's actions fit the elements of the crime. For such a
defendant the concepts of factual and legal guilt tend to merge and the objective truth exists only as it
emerges from the fact-determining process at trial." (citation omitted)).
15. SeJenny E. Carroll, Graff Sp4, mad Crime, 103 MINN. L REV. 1285,1342-43 (2019).
16. S Jessica M. Eaglin, Cmm"zdhg Reddirm Rirk, 67 EMORY LJ. 59, 94 (2017) ("Arrest is an
action taken by police officers under authority of the state.'.
17. See Kohler-Haunsmann, sara note 3, at 630 ("We can never directly interpret arrest rates as an
index of underlying criminal behavior because reporting and police practices mediate criminal events and
arrests.').

18. S hifm notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
19. Se eg., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948) (Arrest without more does not, in
law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or impair the credibility of a witness. It happens to the
innocent as well as the guilty.").
20. Se Alexandra Natapoff, Avgaiox axd Uran Midanors,40 FORDHAM URB. J.1043,1052
(2013) (mentioning the au m requirement that exists "in all but a handful of cases").
21- Se Adam M. Gershowitz, ProaarialDhmirsakas Teahabk Moments (andDataba r)for
the Poka, 86
GEO.WASH. L REV. 1525, 1526 (2018) ("Police observe what they believe is criminal conduct, and the
officers make the decision on the spot whether to arrest the individual.").
22. See Marks v. Carmody, 234 F.3d 1006,1009 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Issues of mental state and credibility are for judges and juries [and not police officers] to decide.") (first citing Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d
717, 725 (7th Cir. 1999); and then citing Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994)); Tillman v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 695 A.2d 94, 95-97 (DC. 1997); Josh Bowers, Pxxishig the Imm-nt, 156
U. PA. L REV. 1117, 1161 (2008) ("Petty charges often stem from police observation of supposed crime,
not police investigation of crime reports. If the defendant is innocent, it is frequently because the police
saw something and wrongly assumed that it was criminal" (footnote omitted)); id at 1161 n.224 ("I'res-
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Third, factors other than a belief in guilt incentivize police officers to arrest.23 Law enforcement officers may experience pressure---external and/or
internal-to increase the volume of their arrests for job advancement (or job
preservation). 24 Arrests can also bring other financial benefits, whether by allowing officers to claim overtime pay25 or to seize property by means of civil
forfeiture, 26 or by increasing agency revenue. 27 In addition, arrests may offer a

passing is the clearest example. Usually, if the defendant is innocent, it is because she had permission to be
at the location, not because another individual trespassed.').
23. See Alicia M. Hilton, Afrathw to the Exchvaoay Rik After Hudson v. Michigan" Prumg and
Rmvdyiq Poise Mircondsct, 53 VILL. L REV. 47, 70-71 (2008); K Babe Howell, Prre'aoiaDicretion and the
Daet to Seek J sri in an O0wlmdexed CriwixaJmtis Syste, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 293 (2014) (CThe
pressure on police to exercise discretion to make arrests for minor offenses, such as enjoying a beer on

one's own stoop on a summer evening, has significandy increased the number of individuals in the lower
criminal courts that the public might deem to be normatively innocent."); ii at 318 n181 (discussing pressures on police to meet quotas).
24.

Se Gershowitz, npm note 21, at 1532 ("[P]olice sometimes make warrantless arrests for their

own benefit. Police departments track arrest statistics to prevent officers from ducking work and wasting
their shifts. Officers therefore might arrest an individual to improve their arrest numbers." (footnotes omitted)).
25. See id at 1532-33 ("[l]n some jurisdictions, because police officers are paid overtime for appearing in court, they have an incentive to make arrests that will lead to court pay. One prosecutor (who wished
to remain anonymous) explained that some police officers are more prone to arrest if they think they will be
paid overtime to testify in court, even if the case is weak." (footnote omitted)); Rachel A. Harmon, Why.
Anvt?, 115 MICH. L REv. 307, 360 (2016) (stating that police departments "use arrest numbers as a measure of productivity and a basis for overtime pay").
26. See Jain, s 0ra note 8, at 819 (Arrests can.., give police officers the opportunity to respond to
incentives that have little to do with crime control--such as seizing property through civil forfeiture laws or
responding to arrest quotas.'). Note that forfeiture can occur even when there has been no arrest, sa Scott
Witbose a Crwind Ganion?,PEW CHARrrABLE TRS. (Feb. 8,
Rodd, Shod Poha Be Al/sawd to KeeP IPoey
2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/02/08/should-pae-be
-allowed-to-keep-property-without-a-ciminal-conviction, but an accusation of criminal wrongdoing may
Jurs to Camider th Ttiaony of
serve to justify such forfeiture, see Vida B. Johnson, Bias in B/& IWt
Polia

Offiar Witnmrw

6 Caution, 44 PEPP. L REV. 245,289-90 (2017).

27. See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (ThomasJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(observing that many states, and the federal government, allow law enforcement to keep 100/0 of the value
of forfeited property); Karena Rahall, The Grmn to B/se Pot&£i' D'fene Conra ors and the P& Indwfta Copes, 36 CARDoZO L REV. 1785, 1800 nA03 (2015) (stating that certain federal grants were awarded to
police departments "based entirely on the number of drug arrests made by each department and drug arrests skyrocketed as a result"); Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Why Poliae Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/whypolice-officrs-lie-under-oath.html
2013),
("In the war on drugs, federal grant programs like the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
Program have encouraged state and local law enforcement agencies to boost drug arrests in order to compete for millions of dollars in funding. Agencies receive cash rewards for arrsting high numbers of people
for drug offenses, no matter how minor the offenses or how weak the evidence"); Derek Draplin &
Kah'yn Riley, Opinion, 7Innoearn Unti Prmrn Gtd4ty' Should Mem What it Says, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2017),
98
5
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/03/10/civi-asset-forfeiture-michigan-police-couan/
22526/ (noting, regarding civil asset forfeiture, that "[m]ost states allow law enforcement to keep at least
45% of the value of forfeited property, while in Michigan police get to keep up to 1000/6'); Shelby Grad,
Frgaeon,Mo. 's A/lwd Remnue Scawn Echo in Souhest LA Cots, L-A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015, 9:11 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-in-ferguson-missouri-abuss-echo-southast-los-nges-cou
nty-20150305-story.html (describing the Ferguson Police Department's use of arrests as a "revenuegenerating scheme").
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way to control a situation, 28 conduct searches,29 give new recruits experience
and training,30 or collect pedigree information for future investigations. 31 Perhaps, one might respond, these incentives exist but have no impact; after all,
for them actually to bring about arrests might require police officers to lie.
Unfortunately, however, it does appear that police officers sometimes lie, 32
even or especially about important things like probable cause, 33 and that such
lies may be encouraged or enabled by the work environment,34 and legal systern,35 in which they operate. A police statement can be sufficient support for

an arrest; evidence of police falsity helps to undermine the notion that an arrest establishes factual guilt.
Finally, while it is impossible to quantify the number of people who have
been arrested in the absence of factual guilt, we know that there are at least
some.36 We also know that many arrests do not lead to convictions.3 7 Indeed,

28. See,eg, Josh Bowers, Legal GAd, Normatiw Inaminc and &eEqitabk Deaioi Not to Prakse 110
COLUM. L REv. 1655, 1701 (2010) ("[Tjhe officer may have made the arrest only to further some conml
objective. (In which case, the officer already may have extracted the full value of the arrest once the arrestee
has been processed fully through central booking.)" (footnote omitted)).
29. See id at 1694-95.
30. Seei at 1695.
31. See id
32. See Morgan Cloud, The D Lite Secrt, 43 EMORY LJ. 1311, 1348 (1994) (cataloging multiple
reasons why the problem persists); Julian Darwall & Martin Guggenheim, Fnis the Peopk': Rgbt, 15
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 619, 637 (2012) ("Articles, studies, legal decisions, and investigative commissions have detailed problems of police misconduct and falsifications.... Police officers frame suspects
by planting drugs on them or fabricating evidence; assault individuals and then cover their crimes by arresting the victims and falsely accusing them of crimes; and arrange to have evidence falsified in crime laboratories.'); Stanley Z. Fisher, 'msstthe Fas, Ma'am".Lyixg and the Omiruox q'vfFxratow
Etid. ix PoAe Repor, 28 NEw ENG. L REv. 1, 12-17 (1993) (cataloging multiple kinds of police lies); Andrew J. McClurg,
Good Cop, Bad COp: Unn8 Cos Diussaw Teg to Rede Pohke Ln&32 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 389, 417
(1999) (American law is rife with examples of criminal injustice attributable to police falsification.'). Note
that police perjury happens often enough that the phenomenon has its own name: testilying. Se, q., Kate
Levine, How We Pewecst t6e Poli, 104 GEO. LJ. 745, 763 (2016).
33. See, eg., Fisher, ser note 32, at 16 & n.73; Alexander, wfpr note 27; Peter Keane, Opinion, Why
Copt Lk, SFGATE (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Why-cps-lie-23
88737.php ("Police officer perjury in court to justify illegal dupe searches is commonplace. One of the dirty
little not-so-secret secrets of the criminal justice system is undercover narcotics officers intentionally lying
under oath. It is a perversion of the American justice system that strikes directly at the rule of law. Yet it is
the routine way of doing business in courtrooms everywhere in America.!).
34. See Daniel Givelber, Memq1,s Aqita , MeaniamWs Comxdikos: Do We ReliabAcq, t the Imoet?,
49 RUrGER$ L REV. 1317, 1345 n.87 (1997) ('[1]t is at least arguable that lying on the part of police in drug
cases reflects the combination of the radical criminalization of drug offenses, racial bias, and a culture of
policing which protects, rather than exposes, miscreants within the force."); Alexander, Upra note 27
("Mhe police have a special inclination toward confabulation,... [and] disturbingly, they have an incentive
to lie.").

35. Se, g., Janet Moore, Dec
an Cnai Dind
usy R*Fw After Connick and Garcetti, 77
BROOK. L REv. 1329 (2012) (discussing how evisceration of civil rights remedies promotes police misconduct).
36. Se Natalie. Lyons, PnrAwed Gily Unti Prmn Inomat CAfna Pamd Co& Sctiod 851.8 and t6e
Idic of bVoug a FaAtea Imoe
Standard n Amud Pmm 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 485, 489
(2013).

[Vol. 70:4:987
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as Issa Kohler-Hausmann puts it, in some contexts "arrest without conviction
is not only possible, but is the norm. '38 Legal guilt is an imperfect proxy for
factual guilt, 39 but it is the primary proxy that we have, as the next Subpart will
discuss.
B. Amts

Legal Guilt

0
Legal guilt is defined in this Article as a procedurally valid conviction4
Our system for determining legal guilt, which sets up various processes and
protections that must be honored in order to permit a valid declaration of

legal guilt, is the primary proxy that we have for factual guilt.41 For all its imperfections, 42 it is the best that we currently have. Only an all-seeing, all37.

See Brady, npra note 2, at 3 ("[In a number of large jurisdictions, the majority of criminal cases

at the state level, both misdemeanors and felonies, are dismissed without prosecution."); Gary Fields &
John

R. Emshwiller, As Amut Recur

18, 2014),

Ri* Anmei m FindConueqem Can Lad a Lfem WALL ST. J. (Aug.

https://www.wsj.com/artides/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-

lifetime-1408 415402 (stating that 47% of those arrested are not convicted).
38. Kohler-Hausmann, js ra note 3, at 641.

39. See Bowers, snranote 28, at 1170-71 ("Courts have allowed defendants to plead guilty to daytime burglaries to satisfy lesser charges, even when the crimes indisputably occurred in dark of night.
Courts have upheld pleas to 'hypothetical crimes' that exist in no penal code and require impossible mens
tea." (footnote omitted)); Research Working Grp., Prmwivary Report on Ra and Washgton's CrihWisaMfiJw
Sytem, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 671 (2012) ("Arrest and conviction rates do not correlate precisely with
criminal behavior rates and cannot serve as a proxy for criminality."); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L
, 90 MIC.-L L REV. 604, 613 (1991) ("Factual
Rosenberg, GAdi&Hegm Fnexd Meef the MaHaRaL of Pragwe
guilt has always seemed elusive. The best one can do in a criminal trial is to approximate truth, and only
rather grossly at that." (footnote omitted)); id at 624-25 ('[1n our imperfect world there is only one kind
of ascertainable guilt, and that is legal guilt The search for more is nothing less than arrogance." (footnote

omitted)); Carla Spivack Ki rsnShouldn'tIberitfrom Tbeir Vidhw-Or Shoud Tby?, 48 GA L REV. 145, 20405 (2013) ('[Pllea bargaining is commonly acknowledged to be a flawed proxy for actual guilt.').
40.

See William J. Genego, The NewAdwfray, 54 BROOK. L REV. 781,844 (1988) (under the concept

of "legal guilt," a person "is deemed to be guilty only after the state establishes this fact by meeting all the
procedural demands of the system'); William S. Laufer, The Rhetok of Innmc 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331

n-4 (1995) ("If convicted, whether factually guilty or not, one is legally guilty.'); Stefano Maffei & David
Sonenshein, The Cloak

of the Law

and FnatFa/ngfom the Pinoua Tr

A E

pa Pmpe-Ae on t6e Ex

uionyRuk in the Gifgen Case, 19 COLUML J. EUR. L 21, 24 n.11 (2012) ("A person may be factually guilty,
in that he actually committed the crime, but at the same time not be legally guilty, because the conviction
was obtained in violation of the law.'); Mykola Sorochinsky, Pmlaidg Tortinr, Protediag 'Wild Mokuts's"
Toward a Powr Balan Modd of CrimdProwsfor IntenationalHoan Right Law, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L 157,
166 (2009) ('The pronouncement of legal guilt is only possible where there is not only a factual finding
supporting the guilt, but where this finding is also made through proper procedures.").
41.

i

See David Blumberg, Note, Haba La

fom

the Pan and ito t9e F w Jacobs v. Scott andtte Anti-

sn and Efilw DeathPnalty Ad of 1996,61 ALB. L REV. 557, 569 (1997) ("Legal guilt presumes factual

guilt ....
I)

IslqdriioarRethiig the Seah .fort Tntmh, 56 N.Y. L SCH. L
42. See Keith A. Findley, Awda
REV. 911, 912 (2011-2012) (If one were asked to start from scratch and devise a system best suited to
ascertaining the truth in criminal cases, and to ensuring that, to the extent any unavoidable errors in factfinding occur, they do not fall on the shoulders of innocent suspects, what would that system look like? It is
inconceivable that one would create a system beating much resemblance to the criminal justice process we
now have in the United States.'); Russell M. Gold et aL, Cb:6 n CtivinalSlem',97 B.U. L REV. 1607,
1616 (2017) ('he lack of procedures regulating plea negotiations means that the criminal system cannot
effectively sort the innocent from the guilty during those negotiations. And the extremely high punishments
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knowing entity could speak with absolute accuracy and authority on factual
guilt,43 and as mentioned earlier, 44 even she would be unable to provide a definitive answer regarding certain charges that have an inescapably subjective
component.45 As with factual guilt, there are several ways in which an arrest is

distinct from legal guilt.
First, a finding of legal guilt requires different-and more elaborateprocess than does an arrest. At trial, a declaration of legal guilt comes from a
guilty verdict reached by judge or jury.46 Far more commonly, it is declared by
a judge, as a result of a guilty plea. 47 Arrests, by contrast, are typically effected
by police officers and typically require advance approval by neither judges nor
prosecutors. 48
These different processes bring with them different standards. An arrest
is not supposed to occur unless law enforcement has probable cause to be-

imposed after conviction sometimes lead innocent defendants to plead guilty to avoid the risk of receiving
those high sentences.'); Eugene L Mllhizer, Coxsfwioe A.r Connelly: An Eddeshar Soion for Edding
Umvf bk Conafiow, 81 TEMP. L REV. 1, 9 (2008) ("While the data varies somewhat from study to study,

the consistent conclusion of the research is that innocent defendants are convicted with disturbing frequency."); Herbert L Packer, Ta' Models ofthe CriminalPmers,113 U. PA. L REV. 1, 47 (1964) ("It seems clear
both as a matter of logical inference and of demonstrable fact that a defendant who is out on bail and who
enjoys the services of a lawyer is less likely to plead guilty than is one who lacks one or both of these advantages.'); Donald -LZeigler, HanwxisV Rlser 609 and 608(b) of the FederalRdr qfEvideme, 2003 UTAH L
REV. 635, 689 n.297 ('Guilty pleas may be coerced by threatening lengthy incarceration or high bail if a
defendant asserts her innocence, while offering a short sentence or even probation if the defendant pleads
guilty.).
43. See Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Care for Prka Didroar, 90 YALE LJ. 1581, 1585 n.16
(1981) ('[Factual guilt can never be fully known....').
44. See npraSubpart lA.
45. See Robert P. Mosteller, Why Doa Aawmes Caroo, ba Do, Carr Abot Inxoere, 50 SANTA
CLARA L REV. 1, 58 (2010) ("Even if we know what happened, many cases turn on issues of human motivation and responsibility, which may remain uncertain or which may properly be viewed from different
perspectives.'); George C. Thomas Ill 'Titnb Mah6is" axd CoVkfno Law in & Year 2046, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIi L 215, 227-28 (2007) (proposing the idea of subjecting suspects to a "truth machine," and in light of
complications that this would involve-"[W]hat if the issue is mens rea? Now the fact in the universe about

guilt begins to grow fuzzy. What if the crime under investigation is a white collar crime rather than a common law crime? Is there a fact in the universe about, for example, conspiring to restrain trade?"suggesting that it might be "useful for investigating some crimes and not others').
46. SeeJosh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and e SsebArt of hiug by LAsig, 5 FED. SENTG REP. 126,129
(2012) ('[Trial. .. is the best mechanism for the determination of legal guilt....'); Keith A. Findley,
Lmamsfia Oxr Mistaka:A CraiadJsrtiaComwisiion to Sty Wrol Cwuift, 38 CAL. W. I- REV. 333,
334 (2002)("The jury verdict is our almost sacred test for whether one is guilty or innocent").
47. See Findley, n"epra note 46, at 334-35.
48. See Jain, rpra note 8, at 854 ("An arrest needs only a single police officer's determination of
probable cause."); Gershowitz, sapra note 21, at 1531 (Police officers are not legally trained and thus may
not understand that prosecutors will be unable to prove an element of the offense." (footnote omitted)); id
at 1527 ("Even if we assume that most police officers are well intentioned-which I do--they are not
infallible in deciding whom to arrest. Police receive very little legal training about their state's criminal code.
And officers rarely consult with prosecutors at the moment of arrest to ask whether it will be feasible to
successfully prosecute the individual who is being arrested. Put simply, police are offered little guidance on
arrests and must exercise their best judgment-in determining whom to take into custody and whom to send

on their way." (footnotes omitted)).
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lieve that the suspect committed a crime. 49 This standard is a relatively low
51
one.50 Those applying it, for example, may disregard exculpatory evidence.
Arrests differ still further from legal guilt in that many arrests fail to meet even
52
the relatively low standard of probable cause.
By contrast, trial convictions are not supposed to occur unless the factfinders are convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt; at
trial, the defense has the right not only to challenge the prosecution's ability to
prove one or more of the elements but also to mount affirmative defenses. As
for the guilty plea, while it does not require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt,5 3 it requires more than an arrest does. For example, a court is not supposed to accept a guilty plea unless it is "supported by a factual basis and...
' 4
the defendant's waiver of her right to trial is voluntary and knowing." A
55
guilty plea also typically involves an admission of guilt.
This difference in process and standards corresponds to a difference in
permissible consequences: punishment can follow a finding of legal guilt but
cannot follow a mere arrest.5 6 After arrest, there are necessary precursors to a
49. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
50. See sources cited apm note 5.
51. See Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988) ("A policeman.., is under no obligation to give any credence to a suspect's story nor should a plausible explanation in any sense require the
officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable
cause."); Fisher, mpra note 32, at 30 (noting, during a discussion of his examination of police reports, that
none of the training materials that he examined addresses "the importance of investigating, reporting, or
recording exculpatory facts" and that instead they "reflect a psychological set in which the arrestee's guilt is
presumed, and the only use of notes and reports in the criminal process is to ensure conviction'); Givelber,
mpra note 34, at 1374 ("Police investigations and reports are incomplete and, generally, police do not consider it their obligation to discover, investigate and record exculpatory matters.'). Bt se Bigfod v. Taylor,
834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (As a orollary... of the rule that the police may rely on the totality
of facts available to them in establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause." (footnote omitted)).
52. See Harmon, snpra note 25, at 341 ('The vast majority of arrestees ... are arrested for petty
offenses en masse, often without probable cause.'); Natapoff, sa note 5, at 1331 ("A growing literature
indicates that urban police routinely arrest people for reasons other than probable cause, that high-volume
arrest policies such as zero tolerance and order maintenance create a substantial risk of evidentiarily weak
arrests, that mechanisms for checking whether arrests are based on probable cause are sporadic, and finally
that, if those mechanisms do kick in, police sometimes lie about whether there was sufficient evidence for
an arrest").
53. See Shapiro, Uipranote 9, at 43.
54. Gold et al, sxpra note 42, at 1622 n.57 (citing FED. IL CRIM. P. 11); see abo Gregory K- Gilchrist,
Comidioa and 1,gitma, 48 AM. CRIM. L REV. 143, 165 (2011). Note that some states have
Pka Bag&,&ae
not adopted the "factual basis" requirement See Shapiro, n4bra note 9, at 42 & n.72.
55. Se Ortman, sn note 5, at 564 ('In a typical guilty plea, the defendant solemnly admits in open
court that he is guilty of the crime charged, and a judge finds a 'factual basis for the plea."' (footnote omitted)); id at 564 n.302 (CA/frdpleas, in which the defendant pleads guilty without confessing guilt, are an
uncomfortable exception.').
56. See Erica K Beuder, A Look at the Use of Acqs*Mtd Condd in Seatend 88 J. CRiM. L &
CRIMNOLOGY 809, 843 (1998) ("When the legislature statutorily classifies specific conduct as criminal, it
can only punish that behavior by recourse to the criminal justice system established by the Constitution. A
conviction is a necessary prerequisite to punishment based on that conduct While not always an accurate
barometer of factual guilt, conviction symbolizes legal guilt, thereby legitimizing the govemment's authority
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finding of legal guilt, and thus to the imposition of punishment a prosecutor
must first decide to file a charge; if a prosecution begins, defense is supposed
to follow, ideally involving effective defense counsel, as well as things like defense investigation, defense strategies, and the possible mounting of defens57
es.
II. THE FUSION OF ARREST AND GUILT

If it seemed obvious that an arrest is distinct from guilt, whether legal or
factual, then it may be surprising that the concepts of arrest and guilt often
appear to be fused. The extent of this fusion demands explanation and merits
concern. This Part lays out a variety of indications of such a fusion before
Part I suggests some explanations and Part IV addresses one particularly
urgent set of concerns.
A

Consequences ofA rut

An arrest brings what Adam Gershowitz calls "a huge litany of consequences for the arrestee." 8 Many of them appear to rely on an assumption of
criminal guilt, and this Subpart presents several of these, including consequences imposed through law by the government, consequences imposed privately, and stigma imposed through both governmental and private acts.
The legal consequences of arrest that appear to rely on an assumption of
guilt (or an assumption that one's likelihood of guilt is far higher than the low
threshold that probable cause represents) are numerous. They include a permanent record that is accessible to the police and to others,5 9 violations of
to deprive a person of his life, liberty or property." (footnotes omitted)); Michael Edmund O'Neill et al.,
Partas Proogu Racmintg Rad
m and Cu abiy,73 FORDHAM L REV. 245, 268 (2004) ('The American
criminal justice system presumes innocence, not guilt. It is therefore abhorrent to base punishment merely

upon the existence of an arrest, without more.").
57. See Jain, Ipra note 8, at 820 ('Criminal procedure is intended to place important safeguards
between a police officer's decision to make an arrest and its subsequent consequences. Defendants in criminal cases have the right to constitutionally adequate counsel, the right to suppress evidence that was illegally obtained, and the right to cross-examine witnesses, including testifying police officers." (footnotes omitted)).
58. Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 1530 (mentioning "incarceration, the need to post bail, intemetaccessible arrest records, mug shots, immigration and housing consequences because agencies track arrest
records, the prospect of job loss because of incarceration, and difficulty in finding new work because of

arrest records'). Harmon points out that an arrest can also "affect child custody tights, it can trigger deportation, and it can get a suspect kicked out of public housing." Harmon, supra note 25, at 314. Jain notes that
an arrest can subject students at schools and universities to discipline. Jain, sra note 8, at 812.
59. Se Jain, sra note 8, at 823 ("Absent robust sealing laws, police departments and others may
widely disseminate criminal records, including arrests that did not result in conviction.'); id at 824 ("Every
state now either requires or permits criminal histories to be released to noncriminal justice agencies, such as
those that grant licenses and provide social services. Commercial vendors also collect, store, and search
arrest information. A number of states make arrest information publicly accessible, and some allow anyone
who pays a fee to access an arrested individual's criminal history. And the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
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probation and parole,60 occupational license suspension, 61 civil asset forfeiture, 62 bars on public benefits,63 and threats to child custody.64 An arrest on
one's record can make one ineligible for jury service. 65 It can also make one
ineligible for legal relief,66 as exemplified by a New York case in which a judge
dismissed misdemeanor charges in the interests of justice for those defendants
who had no arrest record, but declined to dismiss for those who had such a
record. 67 Referring to the arrest records as "record[s] of prior unlawful activity," 68 the judge explained his dichotomous decision: dismissal was appropriate
where the defendants had previously led "a law abiding life," 69 but in cases
"where a defendant previously has had or exercised that opportunity, but has
thereafter again disregarded the law, a different matter is presented. Defendants whose criminal records or records of prior unlawful activity thereby present a history of disregard of the law, will not be permitted to benefit" from
70
dismissal.
Privately imposed deprivation that appears to stem from an assumption
of guilt following arrest includes adverse employment consequences. 71 These
consequences can include refusals to hire, 72 disciplinary actions,73 suspen(FBI's) fingerprint database-which was designed to provide law enforcement officials with the criminal
histories of arrested individuals--has long been used outside the criminal justice system, such as by employers who conduct background checks." (footnotes omitted)).
60. Id at 825.
61. Seid at 840(As amatter of due process, alicensee may be entiled to aheaing befbre alicense
is revoked, but not necessarily before an unpaid license suspension. Until 2006, New York City taxi drivers,
for instance, had their licenses automatically suspended for a wide range of arrests, including misdemeanor
welfare fraud or forgery." (citing Nnebe v. Dause, 644 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[W]e think that in any
given case, an arrest for a felony or serious misdemeanor creates a strong government interest in ensuring
that the public is protected in the short term, prior to any hearing [for an arrested taxi driver] .'))).
62. See ii at 819 ("Arrests can... give police officers the opportunity to respond to incentives that
have little to do with crime control-such as seizing property through civil forfeiture laws or responding to
arrest quotas.").
63. See id at 825.
64. Harmon, smra note 25, at 314.
65. See Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1319, 1330-31 (Ali. Crim. App. 1994) (not plain error to excuse
a prospective juror on the basis of an arrest, where state's exclusion statute requires that one be "generally
reputed to be honest and.., esteemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound judg-

ment").
66. See, for example, New York's Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal (ACD), which permits delayed dismissal (and sealing) as long as one is not arrested in the interim. See Kohler-Hausmann,
mpra note 3, at 648.
67. See People v. Ben Levi, 565 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (Crim. Ct. 1990); Anna Roberts, Dwsiuak as
Jwda,/ 69 ALA. L REV. 327, 357 (2017) (discussing the case).
68. Box Leti, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
69. Id
70.

Id

71. SmJosephine Ross, 'He Lakr Guity": Reforming Good CbaracterEivide tAUnki'd Te PrtAptido"
ofGai&, 65 U. PrrT. L.REV. 227, 260 n.140 (2004) (The fact that people are refused employment simply
for being arrested attests to the presumption of guilt'); Fields & Emshwiller, srieanote 37.
72. Ross, epra note 71, at 260 n.140.
73. See Benjamin Levin, Criwina/Fmpk en.tL w, 39 CARDOZO L REV. 2265,2287 (2018).

2019]

AmstsoAs Gwit

reassignments, 75 and terminations. 76
Finally, arrests can lead to stigmatizing acts by both governmental and
private entities. 77 These acts include publication of arrests in print and electronic media, 78 including the distribution of "mug-shots" 79 and the phenomenon of the "perp walk" 80: the parading of an arrestee by law enforcement,
frequently in coordination with members of the media. 81 "Perp" is, of course,
short for "perpetrator," and both the act and the tem-inology used to describe
sions, 7 4

it suggest an assumption that an arrest equals guilt.8 2 As JaneAnne Murray
puts it, "[t]his walk is an embodiment of the presumption of guilt, and the
criminal justice system's faith in the screening role police officers play in separating the culpable from the innocent."83
In light of these consequences, one may wonder about the extent to
which the doctrinal prohibition on pre-conviction punishment8 4 is honored.
Indeed, the law sometimes seems to acknowledge that the criminal process
can inflict punishment in advance of adjudication. Thus, for example, when
New York established its groundbreaking standards for judges to apply when
74. Se Jain, mra note 8, at 815 ("Employers may suspend or fire an arrested worker, even when
prosecutors or judges determine that a rogue, police officer made a false arrest.").
75.
76.
77.

S id at 812.
See id at 840 ("Some employers suspend or terminate at-will employees based on the arrest.').
Se Shayna Jacobs et al., Hate-fieed Ba&mor Man Saw Fint T/wum as 'ractic' To KWAddiand

Bhack Men' in Tios Sqmar, N.Y. DAELY NEWS (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.nydaflynews.com/new-york
/white-supremacist-kier-planned-canmage-times-square-ardde-1.3006719?cid=bidy ("Jackson was led into
court wearing a white Tyvek suit for a second straight day, with his hands cuffed and his feet shackled.').
78. See Frangois Quintard-Morinas, The Pmmwtion of Ibnonce inthe French andAnglo-Awftican Lgal
Tmw , 58 AM. J. COMP. L 107, 147 (2010) (referring to a New York Post frnt page showing "an accused in shackles with the headline 'Monster in Chains,"' and noting that "the distinction between accused
persons and convicted offenders has become staggeringly blurred in the United States").
79. Se Tim Stelloh, Opinion, Innt
Unil Yo*r MAgshot Lron theIntmn N.Y. TIMES (une 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/opinion/sunday/innocent-unt l-your-mug-shotis-on-te-intemet.
htmL
80. Se JaneAnne Murray, A PoatPrwoaott- The Peopk of theState of New York Verne Dom6nqne
Sranw-Kabn, 8 calM L & PHIL 371, 373 (2013) ("Strauss-Kahn experienced the presumption of guilt in
the early stages following his arrest, most memorably in a humiliating 'perp walk,' the prosecutors' opposition to bail, and the swift decision to indict.'); id at 378 (CThere are... few countries that subject highprofile arrestees to the humiliation of the 'perp walk.' Rightly condemned worldwide as abhorrent to the
ethos of the presumption of innocence, the images of Strauss-Kahn paraded in handcuffs carred enormous
potential to sear him in the public's imagination as guilty. These events are not accidents; they are orches-

trated as a reward to the investigating officers." (footnote omitted)).
81. See Ryan Hagglund, Consdio Pmteons.Agnast the Hosw to Smspa inCmm

Ste,,n f

Prp Wa/k, 81 MISS. LJ. 1757, 1767 (2012) ("Perp walks are a natural outgrowth of the symbiotic relationship between law enforcement and the media. Accordingly, the police often assist the media's efforts to

obtain images of a suspect in custody." (footnote omitted)); id at 1769 ("In the most egregious instances,
the police will stage a perp walk, moving a suspect for a short distance and returning him to the place where
he is being held, for no reason other than the creation of an opportunity for the press to observe the sus-

pect being moved while in custody.").
82. See Scott Sayare et al., Fnvh Shocked b IMF Chfs ' Pep Walk,"N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2011),
http://thelede.blogs.nyimes.com/2011/05/16/frnch-shocked-by-i-m-f-chiefs-perp-walk/.
83.

Murray, sApra note 80, at 378.

84. Se Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
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deciding whether to dismiss prosecutions in the interests of justice, one of the
factors for them to consider was the "punishment already suffered by the defendant. 8 5 Even when the statutory language changed,86 the factor maintained its relevance in the case law of that state and others, 7 with courts freely
using the term "punishment" to refer to preadjudication harms, including
harms from and related to arrest, such as postarrest confinement.8 8 Thus,
these consequences of arrest, and the ways in which the case law portrays
them, hint at a regime in which the arrest represents the adjudicative moment,8 9 and punishment follows therefrom.9°
B.

"Recidivism"

The legal definition of "recidivism" is relatively straightforward. It means
a return to criminal conduct. 91 How to measure recidivism is a much bigger
issue, 92 particularly given the importance of the concept 93 Experts view recidivism as crucial to both the study of individuals94 and the study of policy

85. People v. Clayton, 342 N.YS.2d 106, 110 (App. Div. 1993); see alto People v. James, 415
N.Y.S.2d 342, 346 (Crim. Ct. 1979) ("Each of these defendants has been arrested and spent at least some
time incarcerated awaiting arraignment The Court considers this enough punishment to satisfy this element
of Clay~tn.'); Roberts, sipmr note 67, at 372 & n.330 (discussing these cases).
86. See N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW SS 170.40,210.40 (McKinney 2007).
87. See, e.g., People v. Gragert, 765 N.Y.S.2d 471, 476 (Crim. Ct. 2003) ('[D]ue to the erroneous
warrant, the defendant has already suffered a 'punishment' far greater than what would have resulted from
her conviction in this case.").
88. See eg., State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 239 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (dismissing case alleging bubble gum theft where "[t]he consequences which have already attended the arrest of this defendant
are more punitive than those which would follow conviction"); People v. Doe, N.Y. LJ., April 6, 1979, at
12 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978) ("The defendant has been subjected to punishment by virtue of his incarveration
[sic] from the time of his arrest at approximately 5:40 A.M. on Sept. 22, 1978, until his release from custody
upon parole at approximately 8:30 PL later that day, a period of about 14 hours."); id (stating that postarrest life "effectively amounted to ... emotional and psychological incarceration').
89. Jocelyn Simonson has explored the idea that the setting of bail often marks the true adjudicative
moment. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail NuVazfhfn, 115 MICH. L REV. 585, 585 (2017) ('[F]or indigent defendants, [bail] often serves the function that a real trial might, producing guilty pleas and longer sentences
when an individual cannot afford to pay their bail.!).
ma# MALCOLM M. FEEIEY, THE PRocEss Is THE PUNISHMENT (1979).
90. See
Joan Petersilia, Rmi&sA ix ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 382, 382 (Matilyn D.
91.
McShane & Frank P. Williams HI eds., 1996) (defining "recidivism" as "an offender's return to crime").
92. SeeJohn Nally et al., Post-Rease Raeis and EfeploywextAsaong DiWnt Types of ieleased Oders,
9 INT'LJ. CRIM. JUST. SC. 16, 20 (2014) ('[Flive major indicators have been identified as measures of recidivism, including (1) police arrest, (2) a criminal charge for a new offense, (3) a reconviction for a new criminal offense, (4) re-incarceration, and (5) a court-mandated supervision revocation (eg., a probation or parole violation) .... !).
93. See MARIE GO'iSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LocKDoWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 101 (2015) ("Reducing the recidivism rate now dominates all discussions of justice reinvestment
and of penal policy more broadly.!).
94. S, eg., Nally et aL, nom note 92, at 19 ("Post-release recidivism is regarded as the primary
measure of the success of an offender's reentry into the community.").
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choices; 95 indeed, it has been called "an existential test of the criminal justice
system generally." 96 Its importance stems in part from the variety of prescriptions that may be inspired by recidivism data. These include prescriptions
about whether, how, and how long society should punish;97 what if any rehabilitative or reentry programs should be funded or offered;98 how probation
and supervised release should function; 99 how bail and pretrial detention
should be used; 100 whether "diversionary and treatment programs" are working;101 how policing should happen; 102 and so on.

Certain knowledge of recidivism can be as elusive as certain knowledge of
factual guilt' 03 -indeed, more so, because one would need to know about at
least two instances of criminal conduct per person ((1) the initial criminal conduct, and (2) the return to criminal conduct). Therefore, those wishing to
95. Petersilia, nora note 91, at 382 ("Reducing recidivism... is one of the most important goals of
the criminal justice system."); Laura Ravinsky, Rda.dng Rm
w of Violent Offend-e Thgh VdMdiadn'A FreshStar, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL 1019, 1026 (2016) ("Recidivism analyses serve a
critical societal role by allowing researchers to determine whether resources are being used efficiently and

appropriately.").
96. Robert Weisberg, MAeanngs andMearmo(Rddism,87 S. CALL REV. 785, 788 (2014).
97.

See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE PAST PREDITs THE FuTURE CRIMINAL HISToRY AND

RECIDiVISM OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS 2 (2017) ("Recidivism information is central to three of the primary
purposes of punishment as described in the [Sentencing Reform Act]--specific deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation--all of which focus on prevention of future crimes through correctional intervention.');
id. ("Considerations of recidivism by federal offenders were also central to the [Sentencing] Commission's
initial work in developing the Giddeint Manuals criminal history provisions... and continue to be a key
consideration in the Commission's work today. Recent developments, particularly public attention to the
size of the federal prison population and the cost of incarceration, have refocused the Commission's interest on the recidivism of federal offenders." (footnote omitted)); id ("Recidivism measures can provide
policy makers with information regarding the relative threat to public safety posed by various types of
offenders, and the effectiveness of public safety initiatives in (1) deterring crime and (2) rehabilitating or
incapacitating offenders.").
98. See Charles H. Rose l, Shoxdd the Taidl
Wag the Dog?: The PotentialEffectrofRaddidh Dataon Charackr Ezvina Rads, 36 N1M. L REv. 341, 342 (2006) ("Governments use recidivism research to develop

programs to handle rehabilitation, incarceration, and sentencing."); Cecelia Kingele, Measuritg Change From
Rates of Rea

to Marke

f Dhfte,

109 J. CRlM.L & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript

at 14), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmnabstractjd=3142405 (mentioning decisions about which
treatment programs to fund).
99.

See Nora V. Demleimer, How to Change the Philosoph and Practieif Probation and Se peried Relase.

DataAxatiA, Cat Confth4 Foe on Rmy, and a Clear Mifjon, 28 FED. SEIrG REP. 231,232 (2016) (describing "reduction of recidivism" as "the apparent goal of the efforts to improve supervisory mechanisms").
100.
See US. SENTENCING ComM'N, RECmrVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A
COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW 7 (2016) ("Recidivism measures are used by numerous public safety agencies
to measure performance and inform policy decisions and practices on issues such as pretrial detention,
prisoner classification and programming, and offender supervision in the community.").
101. Nora V. Demleitner, Judidal Cha&nges to the CollaterdImpact of Cri'ninaICoxnvt ons: Is Te Change
in h Oftng?, 91 N.Y.U. L REV. ONN 150,164 (2016) ("Recidivism has become the hallmark of release
decisions and of judging the success of diversionary and treatment programs.").
102.

See Roger C. Park, Characteratthe Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS LJ.717, 772 (1998).

103. See John Pfaff, @JohnFPfaff, TwrrIER (une 21, 2017, 10:58 AM) ("None of our recidivism
stats actually measure it, whatever 'recid' is. They measure CJ contacts (arrests, etc.), not actually offending.").
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measure recidivism rely on proxies. Conviction and incarceration are com1°4
monly used as proxies for criminal conduct in the recidivism context. So
5
too, at least in this country, is arrest'10
While this Article focuses on the complexities of using arrest, it is worth
6
noting that each proxy has flaws. 10 Conviction, for'example, might seem like
the best candidate, given that it denotes legal guilt. However, the usefulness of
conviction rates to signify rates of "reoffending" is complicated by the influ0 7 Convictions may also be an overence of disparities in law enforcement
0 8 thanks to, for example, the coercive presinclusive measure of factual guilt,
u0
sure to take a guilty plea, 10 9 rules that chill defendants' trial testimony, bias
among jurors (and others),' the inadequacy (including inadequate re-

104.

SweRose, swpra note 98, at 348-49.

105. Sw Demleitner, spra note 99, at 236 ("Many US. recidivism data sets are based on re-arrest
rather than reconviction[,] ... [but] European recidivism rates, for example, measure only convictions for a
new offense, though in some countries viohtions of conditions of supervision amount to a new offense.").
106. See Klingele, sepranote 98 (manuscript at 15-16) ("[W]hile the criminal justice system purports
to measure recidivism, what recidivism data usually measure are rates of re-capture--outcomes that turn as
much on luck and policing patterns as they do on deviant behavior.'); id (manuscript at 14) (stating that
longitudinal studies are the "most effective" way of measuring behavior, and adding that "[in such settings,
researchers follow subjects over long periods of time--often decades--periodically surveying, interviewing,
and gathering third party data about subjects' behavior").
107. See Daniel P. Mears et aL, Red& m and Time Semd in Pri&M, 106 J. CRI. L & CRIMINOLOGY
83, 100 (2016) ("A focus on felony conviction ensures that more serious offending is examined and reduces, but does not eliminate, some of the problems associated with using arrest, such as the greater likelihood
that recidivism in such instances includes situations where no offense occurred or measures both reoffending and differential police responses.").
108. See id This means that "recidivism" data that relies on convictions could be doubly ovetindu-

sive, since it uses both a first conviction and a second conviction as proxies for factual guilt.
109.

See Lucian E. Dervan, Otwahnwiamadon 2.0. The Symbiotic Rda'onshb Bewen Plea Bargaifia and

Omnnalizatfin, 7J.L ECON. & POL'Y 645, 652-53 (2011) ('[E]ven innocent defendants can be persuaded by the staggering incentives to confess one's guilt in return for a bargain. ... [O]verctminalization, the
phenomenon that initially created swelling dockets and the need for plea bargaining makes creating the
incentives to plead guilty easy by propagating a myriad of broad statutes from which staggering sentencing
differentials can be created.'); Jain, spra note 8, at 822 ("A 2013 study of low-income defendants facing
misdemeanor charges relating to petty marijuana possession in the Bronx, New York, depicts a setting in
which defendants routinely take plea agreements because it is too costly to contest charges at trial.).
110. See Anna Roberts, ConioanIy Priorl peacbmm 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977 (2016).
111. See Jerry Kang et aL, pAidt Bias in the Coumo, 59 UCLA L REV. 1124 (2012) (analyzing the
numerous stages within criminal case trajectories at which biases can have an effect, including the police
encounter, the charge and the plea bargain, the trial, and sentencing); Justin D. Levinson et al., GAiby by
Tes4 8 01IO ST. J. CRBL L 187, 190 (2010)
lmpDi Raal Bias: The Geil/Not Gwfty Imp#4 Amciai
(demonstrating that mock jurors "held strong associations between'Black and Guilty, relative to White and
Guilty, and [that] implicit associations predicted the way mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence');
Jonathan A. Rapping. L-pidt Unirt H-n Dondm Can Affc Sytmic Radit Asm ptin, 16 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIs. & PUB. POL'Y 999, 1007 (2013) ("[E]ven where people of color exercise their right to go to trial,
there is a greater chance that the fact-finder-whether a jury or a judge-will interpret the facts in a manner
consistent with guilt because of the defendant's skin color. Therefore, defendants of color are more likely
to plead guilty and to be found guilty at trial due to forces independent of their own culpability or the merits of the case." (footnote omitted)); Ronald J. Tabak, The Continuing Rok ofRaa in CapitaiCam,Nobihtamding PresidentObama'sEketian, 37 N. KY. L REV. 243, 256-57 (2010).
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sources' 12 and excessive caseloadsl') of much defense representation, n 4 and
restrictions on investigation" 5 and discovery.1 6 The risk of overindusiveness
applies to trial convictions;" 7 it may apply still more forcefully to guilty
pleas." 8 Convictions are also often said to be an underindusive measure of
factual guilt, 1 9 as in this discussion by Joan Petersilia of important precautions
to be taken by "those undertaking recidivism research, reviewing it, or comparing or reporting it" 120 :

112. S William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoiaof CriwinalLaw, 100 MICH.L REv. 505, 570 n242
(2001) C gislatur... fund appointed defense counsel at levels that require an enormous amount of
selectivity-counsel can contest only a very small fraction of the cases on their dockets, and can investigate
only a small fraction of the claims their clients might have.").
113. See, eg.,
NATL ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIME, MASSIVE WASTEZ THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMFImcA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 9 (2009) ("In Chicago, Atlanta and
Miami, defenders cary more than 2,000 misdemeanor cases per year. With these massive caseloads, defenders have to resolve approximately 10 cases a day--or one case every hour--not nearly enough time to
mount a constitutionally adequate defense." (footnote omitted)).
114. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting ('Seemingly
impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel.'); Mary Sue Backus & Paul
Marcus, The Right to Comid mi Cra nal Cases, a National Crag, 57 HASTINGS LJ. 1031, 1036 (2006) ("We
now have evidence that overworked and incompetent lawyers contribute to wrongful convictions and that
truly well-prepared defense lawyers, with adequate support services, can attack the other causes of wrongfil
convictions, such as mistakes in eyewitness identifications and insufficient investigations."); William S.
Geimer, A Decade oStickland's Tin Horm Dotrialand Phrt Undertming of the Rght to Cotuei 4 WM. &
MARY BILL Ras J. 91, 93 (1995) ('In 1984, Strkland P. Wahixgton effectively discarded Gideon's noble
trumpet call to justice in favor of a weak tin hom. Directly contrary to its rhetoric in Strklan4 the Court
has effectively ensured that Gideon guarantees little more than the presence of a person with a law license
alongside the accused during trial." (footnotes omitted)).
115. See Andrew D. Leipold, W y GranrdJmriuDo Not (and Cannot)Protectthe A -saed,80 CORNELL L.
REV. 260, 277 (1995) ("[A] defendant who lacks the resources to investigate or to hire experts and consequently doubts his ability to establish an affirmative defense or rebut the prosecution's evidence may prefer
whatever benefit is offered in a plea bargain over the risks of trial.').
116. See, eg., Murray, nopra note 80, at 384 ('[Sluppression or late disclosure of Bradj material is a
recurrent problem nationwide and in New York State courts.'); B. Michael Dann, Fr the J-,23 ITIG.,
Fall 2016, at 5, 6.
117. Cf.Givelber, nom note 34, at 1386,1396.
118. See John R1 Blume, The Dlmma ?( the Creminal Dqfndant with a Prior Reord-L.rroncfi the
Wronxg,91 Conzia 5 J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 496 n.70 (2008) ("There are many reasons to question whether many defendants are in fact guilty of the underlying offense. For example, due to jail overcrowding and large criminal dockets in major metropolitan areas, many defendants plead guilty in order to
obtain their immediate release or to get to a less restrictive custodial environment rather than spending a
substantial amount of time in a local jail awaiting a trial dae."); Mayson, mpra note 3, at 556 ('[Sjome number of defendants plead guilty only because they are detained.'); Zeigler, spgma note 42, at 689 ("Defendants
plead guilty for many reasons not related to guilt, and the charge pled to may not be the crime actually
committed." (footnote omitted)); id. at 689 n.297 ('Guilty pleas may be coerced by threatening lengthy
incarceration or high bail if a defendant asserts her innocence, while offering a short sentence or even
probation if the defendant pleads guilty.').
119. See Mia Bird & Ryken Grattet, Reahgment and Reditisw, 6.64 ANNALS AM. ACAD.PoL & SOC.
SCL 176, 183 (2016) ("Reconviction is a conservative measure of recidivism because it omits criminal activities for which there is insufficient evidence or any number of reasons for abandoning a prosecution.').
120. Petersilia, £s m note 91, at 384-85 (offering a kind of "checklist" for those "undertaking recidivism research, reviewing it, or comparing or reporting it," which involves "specifying exactly the dimensions that will be used in calculating the recidivism rates," including the "type of recidivism event).
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It is critical that the particular type of recidivism event be specified, although there is no agreement on which type of event is the best measure of
recidivism. Some have argued that recidivism is best measured closest to
the event (at arrest), since later events take us further away from the offense itself and so many arrests fail to result in conviction-leading to an
underestimation of recidivism. But others argue that convictions are a
defimore appropriate measure, since many arrests are unfounded and12the
1
nition of arrest differs so widely from one jurisdiction to another.
In work that uses rearrest as a proxy for recidivism, one does sometimes
find the kind of careful and explanatory approach that Petersilia recommends.
Some authors acknowledge the imperfections of arrests as a measure of recidivism, compare those imperfections to the flaws that are inherent in other
measures, 12 and then explain their decision to use arrest rates (perhaps in
123
conjunction with other measures), with caveats attached.
But in other instances, one finds references to recidivism that suggest the
same kind of unquestioned fusion of arrest and guilt that is described elsewhere in this Article. Sometimes this fusion appears in explicit (but unsup124
ported) assumptions. In a report on "Federal Child Pornography Offenses,"
for example, the Sentencing Commission defined "known recidivism" to in12s
dude arrests, even where the disposition of the case is unknown. The
Commission stated that its study, "like other studies, assumes that false arrests
are exceptional and that the typical arrest of an offender on supervision reflects recidivism (Including 'technical' violations of the conditions of supervision)."
121.

26

d at 384.

122. See Laura M. Baber & Mark Motivans, Exding Or Kwwge Aboi Redbim f Pemr on
FederalSipenin, 77 FED. PROBATION 23, 23 (2013) (ustifying decision to use rearrest as a primary outcome measure in part because "unlike convictions, arrests are more available in automated criminal history

records').
123. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, anpra note 100, at 7 (CRecidivism is typically measured by
criminal acts that resulted in the rearrest, reconviction, and/or reincarceration of the offender over a specified period of time. These are the three recidivism measures used in this report.... [M]any rearrests do not
ultimately result in a reconviction or reincarceration for reasons relating to procedural safeguards (e.g.,the
suppression of evidence for an unconstitutional search or seizure), lack of sufficient evidence to convict or
revoke, and prosecutorial or judicial resource limitation.... Even using the least restrictive measure, rear-

rest, does not count the full extent of offender recidivism, as many crimes go unreported to police or, if
reported, do not result in an arrest." (footnote omitted)).
124. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENsEs (2012).
125. Id at 296 n.17.
126. Id "Technical' violations of supervision encompass a wide range of behavior, including absconding from supervision, refusing to participate in mental health or substance abuse treatment, and failing drug tests. In addition, sex offenders typically are subject to additional restrictions, such as prohibitions
on associating with minors or frequenting places where minors regularly appear, and accessing the Internet
without permission." It at 297. Note that recidivism figures on arrest often include not only arrests for
alleged crimes, but also "arrests for alleged violations of supervised release, probation, or state parole." U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 100, at 7. A parole violation is "generally something that is not a crime
for anyone who is not on parole--things like going to a bar or visiting a friend who's also an ex-felon." Ira
Mark Ellman & Tara Eliman, 'Fsihteai and High": The Supreme Coad#s CrudalMirtake Abot Sex Crim
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More often, an assumption that an arrest equals guilt goes unstated in
sources that refer to rearrest as recidlivism without caveat, despite the differences between arrest and both factual and legal guilt. This can occur in primary research or in secondary sources that fail to mention the. fact that the recidivism data being discussed is based in whole or in part on arrest.1 27 When
viewed in combination with the other data that this Article describes, this apparent lapse in careful sourcing and critical analysis may be explained by an
underlying pull to fuse arrest with guilt, such that the need to identify and describe the underlying data is overlooked.
Since recidivism consists of criminal behavior followed by further criminal behavior, arrests can be--and are-used as a proxy for either initial criminal behavior or subsequent criminal behavior, or in some instances both. Arrests appear fused with initial criminal behavior in assertions that judges
considering whether to set bail--on a legally innocent defendant-need to
consider the risk of "further offenses," 128 or in assertions that those diverted
from the criminal justice system (before guilt is determined) may "recidivate,"' 129 or in language that lumps "arrestees" into the family of "offenders" 130 : in the words of one article, "in terms of offenders' likelihood to engage in future criminal conduct, it makes little sense to separate those offenders
131
who have on_ arrestsfrom those who have convictions.'
Arrests appear fused with subsequent criminal behavior when those arrested
after prison are described as "recidivists."' 132 These sources equate arrests with
"criminal acts,"

133

"antisocial behavior,"' 134 "misbehavior,"' 135 or "miscon-

Staiiia, 30 CONST. CoMMENT. 495, 501 (2015). Arrests based on alleged violations, as opposed to alleged

crimes, are beyond the scope of this Article.
127. See Keith Sootill, Sex Offender RadiM, 39 CRIME &JUST. 145,159 (2010) ('Assessing sources
is tedious but essential work in interpreting recidivism rates.").
128. See, eg., RA. Duff, Pe-Tna Dtentkin and the Pmtmspion Isnnoa,
LIMn oF THE CRIMINAL LAw 120 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013).

129.

See eg., Virginia Aldig Hiday et al, EffiAsvw

in PREVENTION AND THE

of a Shbo-Term Metal Halth

Coum Crkwinal

Rmidirm One Year Poiai, 37 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 401 (2013) (discussing "recidivism"-that is, arrest-

of participants in a mental health court, into which participants are diverted preadjudication); Jennifer L
Skeem et al., Cemd Poiqfor Offenden with Mental llnars: Cnatin a Nw Paradgmfor Readnim Rteddtx, 35
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 113 tbl.1 (2011) (including within a category labeled

s "Contemporary pro-

gram[s] for ifenden with mental illness" a "jail diversion" program, in which participants with mental illness
are dAwtdfin jailinto
hiamt
4 eitherpre- orpost-ookjg and in tracking the "recidivism" rates of its participants, stating that there is "[n]o difference between groups in nreast over one year" (emphasis added)).
130. See, eg., Patrick Kemneally, Lei/aion to Adxit E dene ofPmpwi* When Pmoetng DUT Reididits, 37 N. ILL U. L REV. 126,129 & n.7 (2016).
131. O'Neill et al, srpra note 56, at 268 (emphasis added).
132. S* g., Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Radihirm of Priro m ReAared in 1994, 15 FED.

SENTlG REP. 58 (2002).
133. See U.S. SENTENCING COM'N, hipra note 100, at 7 ("Recidivism is typically measured by criminal acts that resulted in the rearrest, reconviction, and/or reincareration of the offender over a specified

period of time.').
134. Cmpa Jason Matejkowskd & Michael Ostermann, Seious Mental lhnar, CrinidRisk. Panik
Su
mi
n, and Reddim Testng of Conditio lEffear, 39 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 79 (2015) ("By combining
rearrests and revocations into a measure of 'recidivism,' we represent the first officially recognized antiso-
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duct," 136 despite the many factors that can lead to an arrest inthe absence of
crime commission. 137 One article even talks about arrests being "committed." 138 In these sources, record-of-arrests-and-prosecution sheets ('"RAP
sheets") are given credence as accurate indicators not only of arrests but of
criminal conduct lying behind those arrests. 139 Indeed, the words "arrest" and
"crime commission" are sometimes used interchangeably, as in this article on
"recidivism of prisoners": "Some released prisoners crossed State lines and
commimed new crimes. For exampk, some of the prisoners reeased in Delaware in 1994
were arrested for new crimes in Pennsylvania in 1995 ... ."140 Arrests appear

fused with both initial and subsequent criminal behavior in sources that detect
"recidivism" in the scenario where participation in diversionary programs (ab4
sent a conviction) is followed by rearrest.' '
Thus, in numerous writings on recidivism, one sees arrests being used,
without caveat or analysis, as equivalent to guilt. The concepts seem to be
fused' 42 despite their distinctness and despite the particular need for precision
cial behavior that is exhibited by the former prisonr....),xitb MARK H. MOORE ETAL., REPORT OF THE
PROJECT ON PUBLIC DANGER, DANGEROUS OFFENDERS AND THE CIUNNALJUSTICE SYSTEM, ch. III, at
21 (1981) (A criminal record (whether arrest or conviction) is produced by a social process in which the

actual conduct of the individual is a trivial part.").
note 134, at 79 ('IThe definition of recidivism used here
135. Matejkowsld & Ostermann, ajpm
[rearrest or parole revocation] reflects the first officially recognized misbehavior that is temporally closest to
the individual's release date.").
136. See Rose, momr note 98, at 348 ("[Rearrest] is the first point where verifiable and reliable information identifies and quantifies the substantive contact between convicted criminals and new misconduct
that potentially resembles the misconduct that formed the basis for previous conviction(s).").
137. We can assume, conversely, that some crimes are committed without arrests having been made,
see Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Prnawda Dekttion and the Judia Pdirion of DangwesmswforJuenik A NativraiE_.awvet, 86 J.CRIK L & CIuMINOLOGY 415, 427 (1996) ('Rearrest rates may be underinclusive because they do not reflect undetected crimes. However, at the same time, they may be overinclusive because they equate an arrest with guilt." (footnote omitted)), but there is no reason to believe that
these two inaccuracies cancel each other out.
138. Jeffrey C. Sandler et al., Does a Watched Pot Bd'd: A Thie-Senie Axabsir of Nw York States Sex
Offeder RWitaton andNofiatmn Law, 14 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L 284, 284 (2008) ("[O]ve 95% of all
sexual offense arrests were committed by first-time sex offenders, casting doubt on the ability of laws that
target repeat offenders to meaningfully reduce sexual offending.").
139. Cf U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES 294-95 (2012)
(stating that RAP sheets can "only be used to determine the rate of knm w diw," and thus opining that
RAP sheets actually "underreport the actual recidivism rate of offenders").
140. Langan & Levin, si~m note 132, at 60 (emphasis added). For an analogous example of "arrest"
and "offense" being used interchangeably, see Teresa L Welch & Samuel P. Newton, The Hidmy and PnmbAw of Utah'sSex Offxdr Rgi :Why a Mowfir a Conit'on-Basedto a Risk-Amwn tApproach B ttrProtuet
LAw Bu. 1105, 1144 (2011) ("National and Utah statewide statistics do not show a
Childe, 47 di.
decline in sex offense arrests resulting from the implementation of sex offender registry and notification
laws. If the registries were truly effective, we would see a substantial decline in sex offenses within the last
ten years based upon the increase in registry requirements. Instead, arrests for sex offenses have basically
maintained their numbers." (footnote omitted)).
141. See ra note 129 and accompanying text.
142. Cf.Roberts, nora note 110, at 2015 (suggesting that prior conviction impeachment continues
despite all the critiques that it has received because it squares with underlying assumptions that criminal
convictions are useful indicators of criminal propensity).
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when addressing a topic of this importance.
Some notice this. 143 Some seem annoyed by it.' 44 But none seem to have
posited an explanation or tied this phenomenon to the other manifestations of
an assumption that an arrest equals guilt. This assumption, while always problematic, may be particularly problematic in the recidivism context, given the
fact that once one has a criminal record one is particularly vulnerable to rearrest. 145

C Risk-Assessment Tools
Risk-assessment tools are used both to help decide whether to detain or
set bail on a defendant preadjudication and to help decide what sentence to
impose. 46 In both settings, defendants are vulnerable to fusions of arrests
with guilt. And in both settings, the tools are gaining significant popularity.
Risk-assessment tools in the preadjudication context are found in about forty
jurisdictions 47 and in the sentencing context in more than twenty states.148
As Jessica Eaglin points out, most risk-assessment tools used at sentenc-

143. Sn, eg., Benjamin Levin (@hashtagblevin), TWrrrER (Aug. 22, 2017, 8:49 AM), https://twitter.
com/hastagblevin/status/900022109136494593 (noting a flaw in the study of recidivism, namely that "rearrest =/= reoffending").
. 144. Sa g.,Jocelyn Simonson, (@isimonson), TWrTtER (Mar. 22, 2017, 6:26
AM), https://twitter
.com/j-simoson/status/844540912504111105 ("Also can law profs & social scientists stop equating an
arrest with criminal conduct/'reoffending/dangerousness"); John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TwITrER (Mar.
22, 2017, 6:28 AM), https://twitter.com/ohnFPfaff/status/844541272442507265 (retweeting Simonson
with appended message, " Recidivism' is probably the most abused/misused/misunderstood word and
statistical measure in all of criminal justice.').
145. Se MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 56-57 (1984) ('[Sluppose that a person convicted of
child molesting has actually been rehabilitated. This does not make him immune from arrest; on the contrary, that person may be subject (and subjected) to arrest frequently, whenever a child is molested anywhere
nearby. An arrest of this type should not be an indicator of recidivism.'); Bowers, sxpra note 22, at 1126
("[Plolice are prone to arrest recidivists on less concrete evidence, because police often stail with the recidivists--for instance, by directi~ngcrime victims to mug-shot books composed exclusively of prior arrestees."); Mark Kielsgard, My-Driv Sta Pbhsy: An -.Inkteoina Pff*&aW of Rar s and Iarabilioof
Pdophik CObdeffi, 47 CREIGHTON L REV. 247, 257 (2014) ("[S]ex offenders are frequently targeted if any
crime is committed nearby. This is supported by the data... showing a nearly fifty-percent acquittal rate
for new offenses."); Soothill, mpra note 127, at 160 ("1 need to highlight a matter of increasing concern in
discussing reoffending and recidivism. There is a tendency, particularly in the United States, to accept, for
example, arrest figures as a valid measure of sexual offending. Rearrest is a hazard for known sex offenders
and is likely to happen on much less evidence than for other members of the population. Without the
scrutiny of the court, there is the danger of recidivism rates being inflated by police simply acting on the
stereotype of the repeat sex offender.").
146. Indeed, there are many other uses. Sn Klingele, pra note 98 (manuscript at 22) (mentioning
their use in "correctional decisionmaldng); Jon Schuppe, Post Bai4 NBC NEWS, https://www.nbc
news.com/specias/bail-reform (Aug. 22, 2017) ("There are dozens of risk assessment tools in use today,
developed by universities, governments, private companies and nonprofit agencies. They are used at various
points of the criminal justice system, from pretrial to sentencing to parole.").
147. Sn Mayson, ns0a note 3, at 510 (adding that the number "is growing fast").
148. Sn Schuppe, npm note 146.
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ing "rely on arrest as the measure of recidivism." 149 Similarly, in the preadjudication context, Sandra Mayson notes that what is described as an assessment
of the risk of "new criminal activity" usually equates to an assessment of the
risk of arrest5s Treating arrest as synonymous with criminal activity is one
example of a fusion of arrest and'guilt, and Mayson lays out some of its weaknesses:
[R]isk assessment tools should stop measuring crime risk in terms of the
likelihood of arrest for anything. "Any arrest" is an overbroad proxy for
harm. Some eleven million people are arrested each year, their charges
range from unpaid traffic fines to murder. One-third of arrests lead to
dismissal or acquittal. And members of poor communities of color are
151
disproportionately arrested for low-level crimes.
Hannah Jane Sassaman echoes some of these concerns, emphasizing the
key point that to predict risk in the form of arrest is actually to predict law
enforcement activity: "Almost all risk-assessment tools use criminal justice
data as proxies for crime. Most forecast future arrest, which is actually predict15 2
ing law enforcement behavior."
The fusion of arrest and guilt appears with respect to pastarrests, in addition to future (anticipated) arrests. 153 In the sentencing context, past arrests
are sometimes factored into the risk calculation.1s 4 In the bail context, risk155
assessment tools may also consider past arrests as indicative of future risk.
In addition, in the bail context, the existence of a charge in the currnt case is

149.

Eaglin, snpra note 16, at 76 (noting, however, that "some variation exists within this principle

across tools').
150.

See Mayson, nom note 3, at 509 ("Existing pretrial tools assess the risk of two outcomes: failure

to appear (FTA) and rearrest").
151. /d at 562 (footnotes omitted). Rather than repudiating altogether the use of arrest in this context, Mayson reaches the conclusion that "arrest for a serious violent crime" is currently "the best measure
available," and thus proposes its use: 'Tretrial risk assessment tools should instead measure crime risk in
terms of the likelihood of rearrest for a serious violent crime in the pretrial phase. This measure does not
avoid all difficulties, The harm is the actual commission of violent crime. Many people are wrongfully arrested, and many people who commit violent crimes escape arrest So, arrest for a serious violent crime is
still both over- and under-inclusive as a proxy for the commission of violent crime itself" Id
Hannah Jane Sassaman, Debadq Risk-Assermnt Tool, MARSHALL PROJ. (Oct. 25, 2017),
152.
https://www themarshallprojectorg/2017/10/25/debang-risk-assessment-toos (adding that "[w]e know
that certain communities, especially communities of color, are disproportionately over-policed, more likely
to be over-charged by prosecutors, and forced into pleas that result in convictions').
153. Se Eaglin, nom note 16, at 97 ("[R]isk tool developers often choose to estimate recidivism risk
as chance of arrest based upon factors like prior arrest.'); id at 98 (arrest data is, thus, used "as both a
predictor and an outcome'.
154. S id at 82-83 (describing a number of tools that use past arrests).
155. Su Mayson, nprm note 3, at 509 ("Having been arrested before age eighteen might be three
points, for example....). Some, however, have rejected this as a predictor. See, aeg.,Schuppe, mom note
146 ("mhe [Public Safety Assessment's] developers, excluded factors that were predictive but also likely
served as proxies for race, such as a person's arrest history and number of misdemeanor convictions."). .
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frequently taken as indicative of guilt.156 As Mayson puts'it, judges assess the
risk of "new criminal activity," thus assuming that there has already been
"criminal activity"' 57 and thus provoking due process concerns. 58
D. Linguistic Slips"

In at least some instances, "recidivism" is consciously chosen to denote
the rearrest of someone with a criminal record; other terms that are sometimes consciously deployed in a way that fuses arrest and guilt include "criminogenic" (when referring to factors that appear to lead to ams 159 and "sex
offender" (when describing someone arrestedfor a "sex offense"). 160 But there
are also an array of terms that fuse arrest and guilt in a way that appears unintended. Thus, for example, one frequently finds the terms "offender,"'161 "offense,"' 62 "reoffending,"' 163 and "crime,"' 164 where the legally correct terminol-

156. Here, the fusion seems to be between charge and guilt rather than arrest and guilt. The relationship between these two fusions will be addressed further below. See ih9ra Subpart ILE.
157. See Mayson, :ra niote 3, at 537.
158. See id ("Mo invoke a defendant's guilt as justification for pretrial restraint threatens fundamen-

tal due process values, which tend to run under the heading of the 'presumption of innocence.' Defendants,
after all, have only been accused. Many are not guilty. Fewer than seventy percent of felony arrests nationwide lead to conviction. And the protection of accused people against false condemnation and punishment
is a core commitment of the criminal justice system." (footnote omitted)).
159. See general, &g., Avinash Singh Bhati & Alex R. Piquero, Enatiq
te Impact of Iwrmadon oxn
Sebszqwtt Offmdig Traedoi: Derrke Cnmoge, or Nml Effit?, 98 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 207

(2007) (using arrest histories of released prisoners to investigate whether prison has a "criminogenic" effect).
160. William Encinosa & lflchael Ronussis, AR EwpilAaoayisofCakfomi A wby Bill 488: Aaeu
to Informatin on Regteed Sex Offmnder ow the Inttut Rsdarw Reakw, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 429, 446
(2011) (We identify a sex offender in the California Department of Justice arrest data as any person who
has been arrested for a registrable sexual offense."). The fact that "sex offender"--one of the most inflammatory and stigmatizing terms within the criminal lexicon--is used in this way helps to illustrate the

strength of this fusion.
161. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330 (2012) ("Ahtar did not address
whether the Constitution imposes special restrictions on the searches of offenders suspected of committing
minor offenses once they are taken to jail."); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND rrs
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (th ed. 2007) ('Because officers cannot possibly arrest all the offenders they encounter, they must decide which scuffles warrant an arrest for assault."); Michael F. Caldwell,.Qua4ti the Dern*'n n Jmwnik Sexad Rm m RaA, 22 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L 414, 414 (2016)
(referring to juvenile sexual offense arrestees as "juvenile sexual offenders"); Brian D. Shannon, PrstribAg a
Ba/nwm The Tews Lgi/adii Rmpw to Sell v. United States, 41 ST. MARY'S I.J. 309, 339 n.117 (2009)
("Bexar County and the Center for Health Care Services have been leaders in efforts to create meaningful
diversion programs for offenders with mental illness caught up in the criminal justice system').
162. Henry Gass, Met a Nw BreedofPmswabr,CR
SIAN(. MONITOR (uly 17,2017), https://
www.camonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/0717/Meet-a-new-breed-of-prosecutor ("From Texas to Florida

to Illinois, many of these young prosecutors are eschewing the death penalty, talking rehabilitation as much
as punishment, and often refusing to charge people for minor offenses").
163. See, eg., Donna M. Bishop et aL,JmsdkJmwtia UlerAttarAA
a#rf ofte Cama andlwpad of
Reme Rowoba, 10 U. FLA. JL.& PUB. POL'Y 129,146 (1998) ('[W]e examined differences in the severity of
rearrest offenses across the two groups. Ninety-three percent of the transferred youths who reoffended
were arrested on felony charges.'); Enrique A. Monagas & Carlos E. Monagas, Pmmadi Tbat in 4k Age of
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ogy would be "alleged" offender/offense/reoffending/crime. Here, as often,
language seems to serve as a "window to the unconscious ' 165 and, specifically,
into an unconscious fusion of arrest and guilt.
E. 'Etwyo e Pkads Gu ll

'

66

A final example involves a statistical error. Legal scholars, as well as othassert that 90 or 95% of criminal cases end in a guilty plea. 16 8
It is unclear whether those making this assertion are thinking that a "criminal
case" begins with an arrest or with a prosecution.1 69 Either way, these statements are inaccurate. They mistakenly characterize the percentage of convictions
ers, 167 commonly

'SodalMedia, 36 N. ILL U. L REV., Summer 2016, at 57, 75 ("[Sluspects likely to reoffend should be charged'
and prosecuted more aggressively, because those individuals pose the greatest risk to the community.").
164. See, e.g., Dana Houle (@DanaHoule), TWrrrER (Mar. 21, 2017, 6:51 AM), https://twitter.com/
2
2
DanaHoule/status/84418477004939 64 (attaching image of headline describing crimes followed by first
paragraph describing arrests, and stating that the "[m]ost broke thing in US journalism is headlines, example
infinity, headline says crimes, lede says alleged. BIG DIFFERENCE").
165. See Peggy Cooper Davis, The ProsrbialWoman, 48 REC. ASSN B. CrrY N.Y. 7,16 (1993) ("When
we are made to realize that, to take a simple example, we use the verb 'to father' to refer to impregnation
but use the verb 'to mother' to refer to nurturing, we learn a great deal about the unconscious assumptions
we unwittingly continue to make with respect to parenting.'); Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neocon-

ervtidw CaseAgains Hat-Speech RzWdation--isvb, D'Sou.a, Gals, Camr,and the Toxgblove Crotwd 47 VAND. L
REV. 1807, 1814 (1994) ("Thought and language are inextricably connected. A speaker who is asked to

reconsider his or her use of language may begin to reflect on the way he or she thinks about a subject.
Words, external manifestations of thought, supply a window into the unconscious. Our choice of word,
metaphor, or image gives signs of the attitudes we have about a person or subject" (footnote omitted)).
David Alan Skiansky, The Natta, and Feaian of ProscsiorialPomw, 106 J. CRIi. L &
166.
CRMIlNOLOGY 473, 487 (2016) (quoting, and disagreeing with, Marc L Miller, Dominaion & Dirsafatiom

Pr0seaeoras Senknen, 56 STAN. L REV. 1211, 1252 (2004)).
167. See Adam Gopnik, How We Mimndenand Mass Incarceati, NEW YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017),
("Some
https://www.newyorkercom/magazine/2017/04/10/how-we-misunderstand-mass-incarceration
ninety-five per cent of criminal cases in the U.S. are decided by plea bargains .... '); Jessica Pishko, PrsecCrimnal-JustiaReform NATION (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.themation
tof Are Bandn Togetr to Prn
("Today, around 95
.com/article/prosecutors-are-banding-together-to-prevent-cminal-justice-reform/
percent of federal and state criminal cases end in a plea bargain'); Jeffrey D. Stein, Opinion, How to Make
an Innoant Clie Plad Gxidl, WASI. POST (an. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/w
hy-innocent-people-plead-guiy/2018/01/12/e05d262c-b805-11 e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utmt
erm=.d28072535321 ("It's no wonder 95 percent of all defendants accept plea offers.").
168.

See Lucian E. Dervan, BargainedJutic:Pka-Bargaining'sIno nc Problem and the Brady Sfety-Va%

2012 UTAH L REV. 51, 84 ("Today, over 95 percent of defendants in the criminal justice system plead
guilty .... .'); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For andAgaimt Sevment Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Sdmet
Coffimnc 33 UCLA L REV. 485, 502 (1985) ('Over 90% of all cases (both civil and criminal) are currently
. .'); Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookiefiom t& CookieJar?. The
settled and taken out of the system..
Lw and Eth of Siftng BammwiCrmn Cases, 68 FORDHAM L REV. 1643, 1653 n.38 (2000) ("Statistics
indicate that over 90% of defendants charged with violent felonies plead guilty.'). As Sklanksy points out,
some just go ahead and say that "[e]veryone pleads guilty." Sklansky, smpra note 166, at 487.
169. Se John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaft), TwrrrER (Oct. 18, 2017, 7"34 AM), https://twitter.com/JohnF
Pfaff/status/920659342201892866 (pointing out that when people assert that "95 percent of federal and
state criminal cases end in a plea bargain," it is unclear whether they are using "case" to mean "prosecution" or "arrest); Adam Gershowitz (@AdamGershowitz), TwrrrER (Oct 18, 2017, 7:36 AM), https://
twitter.com/AdamGershowitz/status/920659898622513152 (tweeting in response to Pfaff that "I think the
average arrested defendant processed in a jail would think case means arrested').
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that are pleas as the percentage of cases that are pleas, and thus they erase
something important. The erroneous statistics erase those cases that end in
dismissal or acquittal1 70 That is a significant erasure. For example, Gershowitz
points out that prosecutors "dismiss a huge number of cases with no convic1 71
tion being entered.'
Figures representing the percentage of cases ending in guilty pleas vary
according to jurisdiction, but however one defines "cases," they are less than
90%. So, for example, according to one recent study, a little under two-thirds
of felony defendants arraigned in state courts in the seventy-five largest counties pled guilty. 172 In D.C. Superior Court, 42% of all defendants pled guilty,
53% had their cases dismissed post-filing.173 In federal court, where there is a
smaller drop-off between prosecution and conviction, the figures diverge less
dramatically from the erroneous version, but they still diverge. In 2015, 88%
of federal defendants ended their cases with a plea of either guilty or nolo contendeir, the percentage of convictions that involved a guilty or nolo contendere
plea was 97.5%.174
Again, some have noticed this error. 175 Some are annoyed by it.176 No one

170. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Co-paratirLaw Witbout LeAzi Hom" Wbat C
Pmcdmm Can Twch CrnmidaiPradun, and P'm Vra, 94 GEO. LJ. 683, 696 n.37 (2006) ('Mihis [95% figure]
disregards all dispositions that were unilaterally terminated or that were otherwise dismissed.').

171. Gershowitz, spra note 21, at 1527 & n.6 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics figures indicating
that "prosecutors dismiss twenty-five percent of felony charges" and citing sources in support of the proposition that the rate "is much higher in some jurisdictions"). Cases may also be judicially dismissed. Sm
Sklansky & Ycazell, snpa note 170, at 696 n.37.
172. In a 2009 study of large urban counties by the Department of Justice's State Court Processing
Statistics project, "[almong cases that were adjudicated within the 1-year study period, 66% resulted in a
conviction," and "In]earty all convictions were the result of a guilty plea rather than a trial." BRIAN A.
REAVES, U.S. DEPr OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JusTIcE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES 22 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc
09.pdf.
173. See U.S. DEPT OF JusTicE UNITED STATES ATroNEys' ANNuAL STATISTICAL REPORT 65
tbL17 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/988896/download.
174. Se U.S. COURTs, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREcroR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNrrED
STATES COURTs, Table D-4, at 1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data~tables/DO4Sep15.p
dE
175. Se Sklansky & Yeazell, a~n' note 170, at 696 n.37 ("It is remarkably difficult to get robust
statistics on the rate of civil or criminal consensual settlement. The most common mistake is to subtract the
percentage of trials from the percentage of filings and thereby arrive at a figure of over 95% of settlements
or plea bargains. That is an error because it disregards the circumstance that many civil cases end with
dispositive adjudication before trial. Those cases end because of a judicial decision that concludes the case,
not because the parties decide to control the risks of adjudication with an agreement. An analogous calculation on the criminal side would put consensual agreements at approximately 95%, but, again, this disregards
all dispositions that were unilaterally terminated or that were otherwise dismissed. Our own estimates, for
which we claim no great statistical sophistication, put both the rate of plea bargain and the rate of civil
settlement at about 60-70/o of filed cases--very high but not overwhelming." (citations omitted)); Adam
Gershowitz (@AdamGershowitz), TwrTER (Oct. 18, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://twitter.com/AdamGe
rshowitz/status/920658466959699968 (stating, in response to Jessica Pishko article, that "95% of criminal
*cases* do not end in a plea bargain. 95% of convictions do. There is a difference between those two
thingsill'); Carissa Byme Hessick (@CBHessick), TwrrrER (Oct 18, 2017, 7:56 AM), https://twitter.com/
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appears to have posited a suggestion as to its cause. The frequency of this
mistake-by people who understand the need for accuracy, precision, and
appropriate sourcing and who are committed to exposing and deconstructing
harmful assumptions about the criminal legal system-suggests that the error
is allowed to slip through because it aligns with an assumption that is pervasive, albeit implicit77: that a governmental act that requires only probable
cause (whether an arrest or a prosecutorial charge) is in fact equivalent to
guilt. If one is conditioned to think of a finding of legal guilt as following on
from a finding of probable cause,178 then one may be less likely to doublecheck figures that suggest the same.

As to several of these phenomena, one might proffer explanations such as
inattention, sloppiness, or shorthand. Perhaps it could be said, for example,
that it's a little sloppy to refer to "recidivism" data without acknowledging
that the metric is rearrest, or to make the plea rate error, or to use "offender"
to mean "arrestee." But sloppiness is more likely to occur when there is no
resistance to it. This Article suggests that these many slips, mistakes, and elisions meet with little resistance because of the strength of an underlying assumption (namely, that arrest equals guilt) that facilitates them all. But how to
explain that assumption? The next Part turns to that question.
III. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
To be sure, there may be some explanations for the fusion that are unique
to a particular context mentioned above. For example, a partial explanation
for widespread acceptance of "recidivism" rates that include arrests (and thus
that lie on the expansive end of the spectrum) may be a widespread, if implicCBHessick/status/920664882026110976 (reproducing Gershowitz's tweet and adding that "Adam makes
an important point here. We should all be careful to use the 95% statistic carefully (and correctly)").
176. SeeJeffrey Bellin (@Bellin), TWrrrER (Apr. 11,2018, 5:13 AM), https://twitter.com/BellinJ/st
24
26 2
atus/984041645 7 10 1 ("[PJlea deals, which is how more than 90 percent of criminal cases end[.]' Why
can no one get this stat right? Don't fancy news sites have fact checkers - or is this said wrong so often it
checks out each time?") (attaching a National Public Radio story that makes the quoted error); Ron Wright
2 7
(@wrightrf), TWrr'ER (July 25,'2017, 11:17 AM), https://twitter.com/wrightrf/status/88991255 8 6
126209 (retweeting Jeffrey Bellin, @BellinJ, TwrrrER (July 19, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://twitter.com/Bel
linJ/status/887819941721669632 ("Keep reading '95% of crim cases are resolved by guilty pleas' when
authors mean to say 95% of convictions_ are guilty pleas.[ ]Big difference.")) ("Agreed. This is annoying.").
177. For the notion that hoaxes thrive and skepticism sleeps when the hoaxes square with our assumptions and biases, see ILA. Lenhardt, Uxdmenad* &eMark Raw, Sifiga, and Eqmahiy in Contef, 79
N.Y.U. L REV. 803,824-25 (2004).
178. Probable cause is the standard to which prosecutorial charges, like arrest charges, are held. See
Brandon Buskey, If te Comndcion Don't Fi4 You MAust Acquit Fxainq the ConstittionalLnitatioz on the
State's Purwitof IncomArtnt Cr inalProsadions,36 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 311,320-21 (2012).
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it, belief that certain people (or groups) have a propensity to commit criminal
acts. 179 There are also some potential explanations that have been thoroughly
explored in the literature, including "tunnel vision" affecting law enforcement
and others. 8 0 This Part will focus on explanations that are more broadly ap-

plicable and less well explored.
A

'A System of Peas"I 81

It may be unsurprising that an arrest, whose core evidentiary requirement
is an assertion of probable cause by law enforcement, has come to seem
equivalent to guilt, given that our predominant means for declaring guilt-the
guilty plea-has as its core evidentiary requirement an assertion of probable
18 2
cause by law enforcement
While of course there is a key distinction between an arrest and (the majority of) guilty pleas, namely that for the latter a defendant is required to
make some sort of admission of guilt,18 3 various scholars have pointed out
that in light of the coercive pressure to enter a guilty plea, 84 the "admission"
should be seen as little more than a formality,185 and indeed a formality that

179. See Roberts, smpra note 110, at 2015 (suggesting that part of what sustains the practice of impeaching criminal defendants with their prior convictions is a societal belief in propensity); Ekow N.
Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Gmy: Punire'igCharadr,Eqxali and the Iklom of Moral Chrderto Crimand
Pwtdirhmmn, 25 CARiOZO L REV. 1019,1032-33 (2004).
180. See, eg., Keith A. Fmdley & Michael S. Scott, The Multipe Diraasiou of Tunffl Viion in Crimintal
Ca, 2006 WIS. L REV. 291, 292 (defining "tunnel vision" as "that 'compendium of common heuristics
and logical fallacies,' to which we are all susceptible, that lead actors in the criminal justice system to 'focus
on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will "build a case" for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from guilt"' (quoting Dianne L Martin, LA.uons About Jusi firo the
'Laboratoy" of Wrol Cmoio: Tmd Vino, te Conshtdoa of Guil and Informer Evidan, 70 UMKC L
REV. 847, 848 (200)); id ('his process leads investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers alike
to focus on a particular conclusion and then filter all evidence in a case through the lens provided by that
conclusion.").
181. See Murray, nepra note 80, at 372 ('The presumption of innocence may be the foundational
principle of the American criminal justice system, but the presumption of guilt is its operational force. The
US Supreme Court acknowledged this reality in two notable criminal law decisions in 2012, L&fler v.
Coer and Missoui P.Fgye, when it described the criminal process as 'a system of pleas, not a system of
trials."').
182. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 43-44 (stating that a summary by law enforcement of evidence
providing a "factual basis" for a plea is probably sufficient where it establishes probable cause).
183. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) ("[A] counseled plea of guilty
is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the
issue of factual guilt from the case." (emphasis omitted)); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970)
(stating that pleas are typically accompanied by admission of guilt).
184. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liabiiij Rk for ConsAit
al Tortr, 99 VA. L REV. 207, 226 (2013)
("For all but the simplest crimes, prosecutors can pile up charges to the point where the incentive to plea
bargain becomes overwhelming.").
185. See Stephanos Bibas, Duigning Plea B igaiingfroa
the Ground Up: Aacy and Fairnue Without
Tria/s
as Backstps, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055,1059 (2016) (describing the required allocution as "barebones").
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may make a mockery of a system that is often said to be interested in truth.' 6
So perhaps it is not that strange, for example, to use "offender" to refer
to someone (an arrestee) who might be guilty,18 7 given that in our system of
pleas "offender" (used in the "proper" sense, i.e., to refer to someone who is
legally guilty) itself only means that the person convicted might be (factually)
guilty.188 This may be particularly true given the centrality of pleas within our
legal system: ours is not just a "system of pleas" in the sense that defendants
are permitted to (and in large numbers do) take pleas,18 9 but also a system
that, given the current rate of charging and resourcing, relies on pleas in order
to continue to operate. 90 If this standard and mode of "proof" establishes
guilt in the plea bargaining context, it does not seem surprising that it has the
same effect earlier in the process. If our system of plea bargaining "shortcircuits" the process of determining guilt,191 then perhaps it is unsurprising if

we in our assumptions do the same.

186. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Chaxgkg Plea Bagbunxg Debate 69 CALIF. L REV. 652, 705 (1981)
('It... may seem strange suddenly to seek the virtues of consent at one stage of a stigmatizing, miseryproducing, and involuntary proceeding. Indeed, in most nations of the world, although civil disputes are
compromised as freely as here, American plea bargaining apparently is regarded as a ,sadio ad aburdwmw of
our nation's commercial mentality."); Bowers, napranote 22, at 1153 (mentioning critics who find that the
propensity of defendants facing weak charges to "plead guilty to cheap pleas" has the effect of "undermin[ng] the system's central truth-seeking function'); id at 1171 ("[The criminal justice system] finds
something sacrosanct and inviolable--even magical-in the bottom-line accuracy of the defendant's admission that she behaved (insome fashion) illegally. Institutional actors (who should know better) hold on to
this last vestige of an antiquated truth-seeking ideal." (footnote omitted)); Arthur Rosett, The Negotiated
GAdy Plea, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & Soc. SC. 70, 75 (1967) ("In many courts, the guilty-plea process looks more like the purchase of a rug in a Lebanese bazaar than like the confrontation between a man
and his soul.').
187. John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaft), TWITTER (Mar. 22, 2017, 6:19 AM), https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaf
f/status/844538941311201281 (characterizing an arrest as "[a] cop's suspicion. Maybe a crime, maybe
not").
188. Sn Albert W. Alschuler, Strining at Gnats and SxwzUong Camels: The Skdm'v Moraly of Professor
Bibas, 88 CORNElL L REv. 1412, 1413-14 (2003) ("The plea bargaining system effectively substitutes a
concept of partial guilt for the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt It is marvelously
designed to secure conviction of the innocent"); Alschulr, s ranote 186, at 703 ("Adjudication is designed to answer the question of which side is correct on a case-by-case basis. Settlement is not designed to
answer this question but to produce an acceptable middle ground.'); Talia Fisher, Coiction Withot Convict/oa, 96 MINN.L.REV. 833, 851 (2012) (noting the probabilistic nature of pleas, and stating that "plea bargains, by and large, adjust sentencing to the level of proof regarding culpability"); Michael Tonry, From
Pohadng to Parole. Reenftgrng Aweincm Ci=n Jatice, in REINVENTING AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3
(Michael Tonry & Daniel S. Nagin eds., 2017) (conducting a comparative review and concluding that
"[n]owhere else is a guilty plea enough by itself for a conviction; a judge must determine the facts, decide
whether the defendant is guilty and of what, and impose a sentence').
189. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) ('[qriminal justice today is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials.').
190. See Ortman, nsra note 5, at 554.
191. See Alschuler, mpra note 186, at 692 ("A prosecutor or defense attorney whose primary concern
is to cut corners probably would find a regime of plea bargaining ideally suited to his goals.'); Packer, nom
note 42, at 38 ("[A] decision that the defendant will remain in custody once he has been charged may itself
induce him to plead guilty, thereby short-circuiting the part of the process concerned with guilt determination and moving directly to the question of ultimate disposition.').
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The Costs of Diversion

The hardships caused by the criminal process, including convictions, are
so grave that numerous innovators have created mechanisms that aim to
avoid some of those hardships. A variety of such innovations, such as diversionary programs, "alternative" courts, and "problem-solving" courts, have
been developed, 192 and a significant component of many of them is that participation can ward off the imposition of a criminal conviction and its mani193
fold consequences.
For all the relative advantages that participation in such programs may offer, one trade-off for this escape from some aspects of the criminal process
appears to be that certain hardships can be inflicted without what the criminal
legal system would (at least in theory) first require-some sort of finding or
acknowledgment of guilt. Thus, to be in such a program--even if one has not
pled guilty as a condition of participation' 94 -is often to be classed as an "offender"'195 and a possible "recidivism" risk, 96 and to be seen as in need of
"accountability,"1 97 rehabilitation, 198 and penance. 199 Thus, by leaping over any

192. See, e&.,Bruce A. Green, The Right to Pka Barga- with Co-ptent CoeAfte Cooper ad Frye. Is
the Spupme Court Making the Orinay CrAialPromu 'Too Lo Too Eensoee , a U .d.
k... i Prrdtof
PeoaJm mt?, 51 DUQ. L REV. 735, 745-46 (2013).
193. See Whitney C. Wootton, DiversionNat Dportiow Mitigating the HarrbImgraion Couequena of
Mio Crimes, 16 SEATrLEJ. SOC. JUST. 217, 236 (2017) ("[Pretrial diversion programs] lead to lower recidivism and allow individuals to avoid the long-term negative consequences of a criminal conviction, such as
difficulty in finding housing and employment.').
194. See id at 242 ("[Pire-file diversion programs do not require participants to stipulate to the
charges against them to qualify for divcrsiorn').

195. See general, eg., Hiday et al., now note 129 (using the term "offenders" to describe participants
in a mental health court, into which participants are diverted preadjudication).
196. See, &g.,
Cory R. Lepage & Jeff D. May, The Amrhnge, Alatka ManidpalPrridalDit Prog a :
An Ix46itiArrsmnt, 34 ALASKA L REV. 1, 8-9 (2017) ("Impact on future criminality (also known as recidivism) is important Approximately one-third of the participants were rearrested for any offense between
two years and four and one-half years after they were admitted into the program, mirroring the recidivism
rates in other states' pretrial diversion programs.").
197. SeeJillianM. Cavanaugh, H4'ig Thse Who Serm Veteran Tahen Co s FoterRehabilitato and
Redva Reiditimfor Offending Combat Veteans, 45 NEW ENG. L REV. 463, 471 (2011) ('Drug courts operate
on the principles of treatment and accountability. Eligible offenders are taken before the drug court immediately upon arrest or apprehension ....(footnotes omitted)).
198. See Jerome Hall, Ojeivm of Federal Ctimi Pr=dara Revison, 51 YALE LJ. 723, 728 (1942)
("The presumption that to be charged means to be giiky has been tenaciously, if unconsciously, entertained
by well-intentioned reformers lulled into complacency by humanitarian motives to substitute 'treatment' for
punishment, and enlightened by negligible insight into the functions of criminal procedure.").
199. See King County, Washington's "Theft 3 and Mall Safety Pilot Project," in which young people,
suspected of shoplifting, but formally accused of nothing, write letters of "apology." KING CTY., WASH.,
REG'L LAW SAFETY & JUSTICE CoMM., JULY 27,2017 MEET G SUMMARY (2017), http://www.kingcou
nty.gov/-/media/depts/execetive/performance-strategy-budget/documents/pdf/RLSJC/2017/July27/R
LSJC-072717.ashxla=en ("[A] young person gets picked up by a loss prevention specialist, calls [Tukwila
Police Department], who walks them down to a community resource area staffed by [Glover Empowerment Mentoting (GEM)], GEM calls the parents and explains that the child has an opportunity to participate in a program. The youth is referred to a geographically and culturally specific group for case manage-
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requirements that guilt be established by means of evidence, these programs
may help to support a notion that guilt is established at the time of arrest.
The Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program
in Seattle,
for example, holds iconic and influential status,2 00 in part because it diverts so
early-postarrest but pre-booking-in an effort to whisk one away as quickly
as possible from certain harms that the criminal process imposes. And yet,
this innovation may bring a cost- reinforcement of the fusion of arrest and
guilt.2°1 LEAD's website, for example, describes the program like this:
"LEAD is a pre-booking diversion program that allows officers to redirect
low-level offendtd engaged in drugs or prostitution activity to communitybased services instead of jail and prosecution." 20 2
SC. Fion ofAct with Cime
As mentioned above,2 0 3 proving the commission of an act is typically not
enough to prove the commission of a crime. Our criminal codes have been set
up to include additional elements, such as mens rea elements, 2°4 and to provide
for numerous defenses. 205 Yet in the assumptions of the police and the pub-

ment. The youth writes an apology letter to the business, the theft charge doesn't get filed, and the youth
participates in voluntary programming and services.").
200. For an explanation of the Obama White House's July 2015 national convening on the LEAD
program and praise of the program in a White House blog post, see Roy L.Austin, LEAD-irg ' WiY to a
More Effint CrmwmJtrti Systes, OBAMA WHIrE HOuSE. BLOG (Guly 2,2015), https://obamawhitehous
e.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/02/lead-ing-way-more-efficient-iminal-justice-system. For a 2018 map
detailing where in the United States LEAD is being explored, where it is being developed, where it is
launching, and where it is currently operating, see LEAD NAT'L SUPPORT BUREAU, https://wwwlead
bureau.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
201. See Anna Roberts, LEAD Us Not into Tovptation: A Rerposm to BarbaraF&ieerr' "OpioidPokdrg,"
94 IND. J.L SupP. 1,10 (forthcoming 2019).
202.

About LEAD, LEAD: LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSON (emphasis added), http://

leadkingcounty.org/about (last visited Feb. 15,2019).
203. See stpra Subpart LA.
204. See Natapoff, nora note 20, at 1052 (defining the "mens rea requiremene' as "the demand that
in all but a handful of cases, criminal guilt requires inquiry into what the defendant subjectively, actually
intended at the time of the offense").
205. See Paul H. Robinson, CriminalLawDqfeme:A SytskafiAntlsis, 82 COLUM. L REV. 199, 203
n.7 (1982) ("Possible bars to conviction include alcoholism, alibi, amnesia, authority to maintain order and
safety, brainwashing, chromosomal abnormality, consent, convulsion, custodial authority, defense of habitation, defense of others, defense of property, de minimis infraction, diplomatic immunity, domestic (or
special) responsibility, double jeopardy, duress, entrapment, executive immunity, extreme emotional disturbance, hypnotism, impaired consciousness, impossibility, incompetency, insanity, intoxication (voluntary
and involuntary), involuntary act defenses, judicial authority, judicial immunity, justification, law enforcemerit authority, legislative immunity, lesser evils, medical authority, mental illness
(apart from insanity),
military orders (lawful and unlawful), mistake (of law and fact), necessity, official misstatement of law,
parental authority, plea bargained immunity, provocation, public duty or authority, reflex action, renunciation, self-defense, somnambulism, the spousal defense to sexual assaults and theft, statute of limitations,
subnormality, testimonial immunity, the unavailable law defense, unconsciousness, and withdrawal').
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lic 2O6 and sometimes of legal scholars, establishment of an act (or even an assertion thereof) frequently seems to be taken as establishment of a crime. This
phenomenon may contribute to the tendency to equate an arrest with guilt,
since the assertion most easily made in support of an arrest is that the defendant committed a particular act.
One commonly sees the act-crime fusion in public discourse. Thus, for
example, only some homicides are crimes, and only some criminal homicides
are murders. It is not unusual, however, for reporting of homicide rates to
betray the assumption that they are crime rates and indeed to refer to them as
"murder rates." 207
One sees this fusion creeping into legal scholarship, too. For example,
among the various definitions given for "factual guilt," a popular one assigns
factual guilt where the defendant "committed the act." 20 It is noteworthy that
this definition has gained so much currency, given that, in and of itself, commission of the act is typically not enough to establish guilt. It is as if there is a
concept of crime, for which an act suffices, that is in a constant tussle with
our societal decision, via statutory law, to say that more is needed. 209
If one looks for explanations of this explanation, one can perhaps speculate about the influence of the "innocence movement." In its first cases, this
movement focused on situations in which DNA could establish that law enforcement had the wrong person.2 10 The person seeking exoneration was able
to say, 'That wasn't me," "I wasn't there," or "I didn't do it." This became
the emblematic form of a "wrongful conviction"2'1 and may have created a
corollary risk that the conviction of someone who was there and did appear to

206. SeeJoseph A. Colquitt, R hkigEnh-apmnit,41 AM. CRiM. L REV. 1389, 1400 (2004) ('Tor the
police and the public alike, the problem is explaining that a difference exists between the fact of the bad act
and the finding of guilt necessary to establish culpability.").
207. See Thomas P. Abt, Opinion, How Not to R&pond to the RiigMxrderRae,N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/opinion/murder-rat-crime.html (discussing, in contrast to
the headline, the rising homidde rate).
208. See, eg., Genego, .mp note 40, at 845 (an individual is "factually guilty" when she "performed a
given act"); Craig Haney, Exneraiton and WlmnWd Condmsatios Expwdg t Zone of Peeived IurAtie i=
Death Poaky Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 131, 135 (2006) ('[Factual guilt] is the ancs rvs, the physical or behavioral component of the criminal act.'); id at 136 ('[f]actual guilt is what most laypersons mean
when they talk about whether someone is guilty--or in the case of miscarriages of justice and subsequent
exonerations, whether an 'innocent' person has been wrongly convicted....'); Paul J. Mishkin, ForewordThe Hb Co4 the Great WriA andthe De Pmu f Tuns and Law, The Spree Coxr4 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L
REV. 56, 81 n.84 (1965) ('As used throughout this paper, the term 'factual guil' or more simply 'guilt'
refers to the individual having done the acts which constitute the crime with which he is charged.').
209. See, for example, the common usage of phrases like "unsolved crimes," or "unsolved murders."
If we were to be true to legal definitions of crimes and murders, there could be no such thing as an unsolved crime or murder, since it is only in the "solving" that we determine whether there was a "crime" or a
"murder."
210. See Keith A. Findiey, Toward a Now Paradig of Cri"aijaswHow the Innocen Moe ent Merges
Crime ControlandDme Prncess, 41 TEX TECa. L REV. 133, 141 n.62 (2008).
211. See Daniel S. Medwed, Inocentrti, 2008 U. ILL L REV. 1549, 1571.
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2 12
have done something would be assumed to be rightful. Thus, the variety
and potential robustness of all the many ways of saying that I may have done
the act alleged, but I did not commit a crime, are easily obscured. Larry L.
Archie, a defense attorney from North Carolina, provoked some chuckles
when his billboard advertisement-"Just Because You Did It Doesn't Mean
You're Guilty" 213 -hit social media, with one commentator stating, "0That
can't be real!"21 4 But it is real, and his work of reminding us of this reality is
valuable.

D. Media Influene
215
Media can, of course, both reflect and shape public perceptions. When
media outlets equate an arrest to guilt, they risk reinforcing this fusion. In one
recent example, a Univision headline stated that "Trump publishes list of
crimes committed by immigrants: the majority are Latinos who haven't been
some pushback, on the basis
convicted." 216 This headline provoked at least
217
arrests.
but
crimes
not
reflected
that the list
Two recurring media practices seem likely to fuel the fusion of arrest and
guilt. The first involves the "perp walk," which is a coordinated effort between media and police2 18 in which images of a legally innocent suspect being
marched from place to place are published, broadcast, or both. Other nations
find this practice abhorrent, 219 as they do our other methods of identifying
and stigmatizing arrestees. 2 °
A second example involves the common media practice of reporting the

212. See, eg., Rudolf Koch, Note, Proers v. OAderwc The PrerRok of Corborafi Evidae in Due
aliou Testimotr, 88 CORNELL L REV. 1097, 1127 (2003) (appearing to treat
s
PrwesAwasis ofEyetnes Idmw

being "the right guy" as equivalent to "being criminally guilty').
213.

Kevin Underhil, just Bweame You Did It.... LOWERNG THE BAR (Feb. 3, 2015), http://oweri

ngthebar.net/2015/02/just-because-you-did-it.htmL
214.

Naomi Sea (@NaomiSeu), TwrrrER (Nov. 18, 2017, 3:51 PM), https://twitter.com/Na-omiS

2 64
eu/status/93203357580486 4 (exclaiming, "That can't be reall" in response to a photograph of the billboard).

215. See Anna King & Shadd Marana, The Fnrtionof Fiionfor a Pmniti Pbhli, in CAPTURED BY THE
MEDIA: PRISON DISCOURSE IN POPULAR CULTURE 16 (Paul Mason ed., 2006) (explaining ways in which

media constructs punitive public attitudes, which, in turn, encourage punitive constructions of "offenders"
and increasingly punitive policy approaches).
216.

See Damik S. Bonmatf & Jorge Cancino, UNIVISION (Mar. 20,2017,4:44 PM), https://www.un

ivisiomcom/univision-news/immigation/trup-publshes-list-of-llged-crmes-by-ifm

ts-the-majoit

y-are-latinos-who-havent-been-convicted"

217. See Pfaff szra note 187 ('Stop. Calling it. A list Of crimes. It's arrests. A cop's suspicion.
Maybe a crime, maybe not".
218.
219.
220.

See sapr notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
See Murray,supra note 80, at 378.
See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 194 (2015) (CFrom an intemational

perspective, publicly accessible arrest records are even more exceptional than publicly available conviction
records." (emphasis omitted)).
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content of police accounts as if it were the truth.221 This includes presenting
police accounts of what suspects are alleged to have said as if those accounts
were fact,222 despite documented examples of false police claims about what
suspects are alleged to have said 223 and of police mendacity more generally.224
This media choice echoes, and may fuel, common assumptions about the
truthfulness and accuracy of police accounts225 and of law enforcement more
generally. 226 If a police account is seen as the truth, and if acts are commonly
assumed to equal crimes, 227 then the police account of an alleged act, which
can suffice for the purposes of an arrest,228 may also be taken as sufficient to
establish guilt.229
E. Se5-Comforing
Assertions and assumptions that serve a self-comforting purpose are
221. Se4, g., Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Raw toJudgment St wo*pMe&a and Criminal
D#ftda, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 95--96 (2008) ("In covering crime stories, journalists typically
rely on law-enforcement officials' views, downplaying the defense perspective while minimally acknowledging the innocence presumption. Thus, news of crime generally exhibits a pro-prosecution bias, rooted most
importandy in this dependence of reporters on official and, therefore, purportedly credible sources." (footnote omitted)); Adam H1 Johnson (@adamjohnsonNYC), TWrrrER (Apr. 5,2018, 8:33 AM), https://twitte
r.com/adamjohnsonNYC/status/981917661515960322 (appending comment "i see the New York Tines
has mind-readers on staff" to New York Times story headlined "Police Fatally Shoot a Brooklyn Man After
Falsely Believing He Had a Gun"); Benjamin Mueller & Nate Schweber, Po&e Fatah4 Shoot a Brookn Man,
Saving Thy Thomght He Had a Gain, N.Y.TIMES (Apr.4,2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/nyr
egion/police-shooting-brooklyn-crown-heights.html (subsequent version of headline).
222. See, eg.,
Jacobs et al., nora note 77 ("A hate-fueled white supremacist told cops his killing of a
random black man was merely a practice run for a racist mass murder spree."); James C. McKinley,Jr.,
A
.Qution Hangs Over a Tria WVy
y Did a Namy Kill 2 ChAdren in Her Can?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytmes.com/2018/02/11/nyremgon/nanny-murder-dal-insanity-defense.htmN.Y. Times
(@nytimes), TWrTER (Mar. 22, 2017, 3:48 PM), https://twitter.com/nytimes/status/844682114901721
088 ("A white veteran with a hatred of black men told the police that he killed a homeless man to make a
statement[.]').
223. S, eg., Mitchell P. Schwartz, Catpeaifg Vims of Pola-FabiatedConfedo, 70 U. CHL L.
REV. 1119,1127-30 (2003).
224. See spranotes 32-35 and accompanying text.
225. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman,JanirComprmeenion and Pub& Poy: PenidPobleor
and Prond Sokhions, 6 PSYCHOL PUB.POL'Y & L 788, 811 (2000)("[M]ost White Americans believe that
police officers
are the most trustworthy wimesses."); Nancy Germer,Is the Jxry Wortb Saving?, 75 B.U. L
REV. 923, 931 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN
COURTROOM (1994)); Andrew E. Taslitz,
TghgnNot to Be LikAe Siyphms: Can Defene C
e Osnsel Penadwv
StatsAa#o Bias inthe CiminalJsti*c Syst?, 45 TFx. TECH.L REV.315, 371 (2012) ("IThe public... too
readily accepts ... police judgment without adequate criticism.").
226. See Anna Roberts, Casual OhradwJwy Eckeuian on the Basis of Ciial
C n
, 98 MINN.L
REV.592, 628 (2013)(mentioning empirical indications that jurors
put "unjustified stock in the credibility
of governmental employees').
227. Se spmra Subpart 1I1C.
228. Se Gershowitz, supra note 21, at1526-27.
229. S Packer, sepra note 42, at12 ("Ifthere isconfidence inthe reliability
of informal administrativefactfinding activities that take place in the early stagesof the criminal process, the remaining stages of the process can be relatively
perfunctory without any loss in operating efficiency. The presumption of guilt,
as it operates inthe Crime Control Model,isthe expression of that confidence.).
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more likely to prosper than those that do the opposite, 23° and they may prosper even in the absence of empirical support. Thus, for example, law professors commonly assert that "law professors have the best job in the world."31
In a system in which arrests are disproportionately visited upon poor
people of color,232 and in which arrests lead to stringent and permanent consequences, 233 some of which appear even to judges to resemble "punishment," 2m it might be self-comforting to assume that those arrested are
guilty.235 (Otherwise, one might have to conclude that we are stymying the life

230. Daniel Givelber uses the term "ego-syntonic" to capture a similar idea. See PnirhingPr0tdadons
ofInnocence" Deixyg Rapuibiy and Its Consequnes, 37 AM. CRLM.L REV. 1363, 1404 (2000). Also relevant is
the concept of "motivated reasoning," which "refers to the tendency of people to unconsciously process
information - including empirical data, oral and written arguments, and even their own brute sensory
perceptions - to promote goals or interests extrinsic to the decisionmaking task at hand." Dan M. Kahan,
Formwonk Neutral Primpk, Motivated Cognition, and Some Prmblesfor ComatonalLaw, The Sptm~e Co ,2010
Term, 125 HARV.L REV. 1, 7 (2011). See general4 Ziva Kunda, The CareforMotivaed Reasoing 108 PSYCHOL
BULL 480 (1990).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Kenote Speech: Rdsamgining Law School?, 96 IOWA L REV. 1461, 1462
231.
(2011) ("Being a law professor is probably the best job on the planet."); Brad Areheart, Adie on Bfcoaing a
Lw Professor, THE UNIV. OF TEx. AT AUSTIN SCH. OF LAW, https://aw.utexas.edu/career/pa

');
ths/academic/advice-on-becoming-a-law-professor/ ("[This is the best job in the world (seriously) ....
LawProfBlawg, The 10 Trthr ofAcadeda for New Texnr-Track Law P ofsr , ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 14,
2017), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/02/the-10-truths-of-academia-for-new-tenure-track-law-professors
("I have the best job in the world, and so will you.');' Wy Lw Thn& NYU ScH. OF LAW,
http://wwwlaw.nyu.edu/acp/why-law-teaching (I find law teaching and legal academia to be the best job
in the world ..." (quoting NYU Law Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler)); Heather Celeste Mitchell,
Law y D&iVn: Intenew with ProfiserSarah Bnrtein, MS. JD (Feb. 21, 2013), https://ms-jd.org/blog/articl
e/law-design-interview-professor-sarah-burstein ('Seriously, I have the best job in the world.'); Q&A with
OF LAW (une 2017), http://wwwlaw.buff
Outgoing Interim Dean James Gardner, UNIV. AT BUFFALO SCI-L
alo.edu/links/2017-June/news-gardner.html ("In the long term, I plan simply to resume my former life as a
UB law professor - just about the best job in the world.'); Richard Westlund, PWefsrsor Osamnxdi James:
Examind Identidy and the Law, UNIV. OF MIAMI SCH. OF LAW (Nov. 2, 2016), https://wwwaw.miamLedu/
news/2016/november/professor-osamudia-james-examining-identity-and-law ("I have the best job in the
world.").
232. See Mayson, spranote 3, at 553.
233. See Gershowitz, supra note 21, at 1528 ("[Wie should not want arreatees to suffer needless incarceration, expensive bail bonds, embarrassing mug shots, possible job loss, and other consequences of
arrest if their cases will ultimately be dismissed outright without conviction."); Harmon, snma note 25, at
312 ("Unlike many other encounters with the police, a suspect who is arrested and booked faces practical,
reputational, and privacy consequences that persist whether or not he is subject to further legal proceedings.).
234. See sura Subpart II.A
235. JEROME H1 SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAl LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 241 (1966) ("The negation of the presumption of innocence permeates the entire system of justice ....All involved in the system, the defense attorneys and judges, as well as the prosecutors and policemen, operate according to a working presumption of the guilt of persons accused of crime.'); Roberts,
m note 110, at 2017 ("[E]ven at the trial stage, to raise the specter of innocence is to make uncomfortable suggestions: not only that law enforcement (both police and prosecution) has made costly mistakes, and
that out beyond the courthouse a factually guilty person may be enjoying freedom, but also that an innocent
person's life has been harmed or ruined in all the ways that pre-adjudication process can achieve." (footnote
omitted)). The point suggested in the text is particularly the case if one is less concemed about hardships
when they fall on those believed to be guilty. Cf Radley Balko, Opinion, The CaseforRdearing Violent qfindWASH. POST (Aug. 14,2017), https://www.washhigtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/08/14/the
ers,

2019]

ArrestsAs Guilt

1021

chances of, stigmatizing, and stripping away the liberty of people on the basis
of their race and poverty.)2 36 If a desire to self-comfort is indeed operative,
then perhaps those people who are erased from the common plea-bargaining
statistical error-people whose cases ended without a finding of guilt--are
erased because dwelling on their existence and numerosity is troubling. Similarly, a view of the police that associates them with truthfulness and accuracy
may be more comforting than the opposite.2 3 7 A view of arrests as acts of the
suspect, 3 8 and thus within the suspect's control, may be more comforting
than the view of arrest as a threat that may be incentivized by factors other
than evidence, 39 and that may be visited upon you no matter how you behave.
An additional self-comforting assumption that might be at play is the assumption that there exists a dean binary of "guilty" and "innocent," "offender" and "not an offender." Under this binary, guilt is revealed by conductthe arrest-and thus it exists before the lawyering begins and is not subject to
the vagaries of resources or skill. It would be-for some, it is--highly disturbing that one's chances of being found legally guilty are deeply influenced by
the quality (and often the resources) of one's defense counsel. ° It may also
be unsettling to acknowledge that in some cases factual guilt does not exist in
a definitive sense,241 and that the only real answer one can get on that question
is what a factflnder concludes (thus again implicating the quality/resources
differential). Some may be tempted to substitute this "maybe-maybe not" or
"let's see what your lawyer can do with that" world--a world in tension with
the Supreme Court's declaration that "[t]here can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has" 24z--for
a world of a nice, clean binary, in which it is not money, chance, or legal skill

-cse-for-releasing-violent-offenders/.utm_terma=.bc9b2f5f97cf ('We want to punish criminals. We want
them to suffer. We create hostile prison environments rife with violence, racial resentment and rape.").
236. See
Packer, tora note 42, at 19 ("[In] the system as it operates, the relative financial
inability of

most persons accused of crime sharply distinguishes their treatment from the small minority of the financily capable.').
237. See
David Luban, An Cruisa/DqfendDxmDfewnt?, 91 MicL L REv. 1729,1741 (1993).
238. See
O'Neill etal,
nora note 56, at 268 ("Mheexistence of an arrest indicates some familiarity
with the criminal justice system on the part of the arrestee] ... [and] familiarity with the criminal justice
system may bear a role in assessing culpability.'); Myrna S. Raeder et al., Comding te Gidtb, AqAditg t&e
IMsaX Rw sAdoptd ABA Poider,20 CRIL JUST. 14, 19 (2006) (referring to Givelber's assertion that
there is a "core belief [shared] by virtually all personnel who work within the criminal justice system' that

anyone arrested is guilty," and asserting that it stems in part from a tendency to "believe in a just world"
(quoting Givelber, nora note 34, at 1329)).
239. Sae supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
240. See, ag., James NE Anderson &Paul Heaton, How Much D0itr D the Lawr Make? The Effd
of Doftiue CotudonMurderCaseOutmeo,

122 YALE LJ. 154, 159 (2012) (alot).

241. Sm npm Subpart ILA
242. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
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that determines your guilt, but rather your misconduct, embodied by your
arrest. 243
IV. WHY THIS MATIERS
There are various reasons why one might be concerned by a fusion of arrest and guilt.244 This Article highlights just one set of such reasons, selected
because of the breadth of its impact. It focuses on a variety of components of
our criminal legal system that require urgent reform, and as regards to which
the slowness of reform may be a puzzle.245 It posits that reform in these areas
requires a robust understanding of the difference between arrest and guilt, and
that the depth and breadth of those concepts' fusion might provide at least a
partial explanation of the obstacles to reform.
A

Defetse Rpmentation

If guilt is commonly seen as something revealed by an arrest-if, in other
words, the relevance of the entire part of the criminal process between arrest
and adjudication has fallen out,24 and if the law is viewed less as a means by
which guilt can be constructed and more as a construct that can be used by
defense attorneys to "get their clients off"247-a variety of failings in the area

243.

Se Erin Murphy, Injnt Dofkw, CHAMPION, Feb. 2002, at 33, 33 ("In the short time that I

have been a public defender, I have learned that most people who ask the 'how can you' question have
already divided the world into neat categories of 'us' and 'them.' They assume that 'those people' are in fact
guilty criminals and therefore undeserving of constitutional protections. Sometimes the 'us' and the 'them'
is simply the speaker's distinction between the lawless and the lawful, the good citizen and the bad. Often
race or economic privilege bolsters the speaker's confidence that he or she will always be counted among
the 'us.' Regardless of how the division is justified, however, the 'them' is always a group to which the

speaker cannot relate, or to which the speaker is confident he or she will never belong. It is also always a
group comprised only of the guilty - as though our laws and procedures were just impediments to the
efficient adjudication of guilt, rather than the engine through which we determine whether guilt exists at
alL"); U.S. DEPvr OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT
DEFENSE 2000: REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE vii (2000) ("In the end, a good lawyer is

the best defense against wrongful conviction....').
244. See sopra Subpart ILB, for example, for the many potential effects of recidivism calculations
that are maximized through the choice to use arrest as a metric.
245. See Andrew M. Siegel, Moasq Daw Ike Wed of lafi wA Propo"fora Third Gwfati oWronfgva, 42 AM. CRIM. L REV. 1219, 1230 (2005) ("The rules and structures of
fid Camintw Scho/arnh aadAda
which I speak-indigent defense systems, prosecutorial incentive structures, plea bargaining procedures,

docket control mechanisms, etc--are over-determined candidates fur reform campaigns in that they both
impose unfairness up front in all criminal cases and lead to the incarceration of innocents on the back
end.").
246. Se Ion Meyn, Why Cibi, andCrihinaProadwvAre So Diffre A Forgpi Hhis , 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 697, 725-26 (2017) (highlighting the thinness of the center of criminal, as compared to civil, procedure).
247. Entman & Gross, mpra note 221, at 96 n.8 ("The defense attorneys, the contending side, are
likely viewed as more biased than prosecutors-their job is to try to get their clients off-and thus their
claims are likely to be viewed more skeptically.").
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of defense representation may become less surprising. These include government-funded defense resources,248 the standards and policing of attorney performance, 249 the incentive structures operating on defense attorneys, -0 defender caseloads,251 and-resulting from these-the inability of defense
attorneys to meet their ethical obligations. 25 2 James Forman Jr. has commented on the apparent tension between the dire state of public defense and the
"scant attention" focused on it in some quarters. 25 3 A fusion of arrest and
guilt may make the phenomenon that he notes more understandable because
if factual guilt is viewed as something established by arrest, then many or all of
the functions of defense counsel may be seen as a waste of money. Who
wants to support those, who are trying to get people off on a technicality?25 4
248. See James Forman Jr., Opinion, Jasse Sprgs Era/ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/opinion/sunday/justice-spngs-etemal.html?smprod=nytcore-iph
one&smid=nytcore-iphone-share r=l ('[N]o aspect of our criminal justice system is as overworked and
underfunded as public defender services. Of the more thsn $200 billion that states and local governments
spend on criminal justice each year, less than 2 percent goes to public defense. Yet improving indigent
defense gets scant attention in the conversation about how to fix our criminal justice system."); see also
Adele Bernhard, Take Coerag&"Wha the Cots Can Do to wpwve the De'r of Crhcna Dfi=re Sen i 63 U.
PITT. L REV. 293, 311 (2002) (Judges are not likely to order the expenditure of funds to hire lawyers and
support staff when convinced of guilt and worried that additional support will only slow the process of
adjudication not change results.").
249. See Bernhard, stepra note 248, at 311 ('[qourts may have been dissuaded from taking action [on
Sixth Amendment right to counsel claims] by the unacknowledged but pervasive belief that anyone who has
been arrested is guilty--a belief which inevitably minimizes the significance of all else in the criminal justice
system besides the swift resolution of cases. The presumption of guilt is a 'core belief shared by virtually all
personnel who work within the criminal justice system' and a major hindrance to improving criminal defense services. If judges suspect that everyone arrested is guilty, it is hard to convince them to strike as
unconstitutional state-funded criminal defense systems that rush pleas or discourage legal research and
creative investigation." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Givelber, asp note 34, at 1329)); id at 312 ("The
presumption of guilt helps to explain why the Supreme Court furmulated an almost insurmountable standard of review for ineffective assistance claims on appeal"); Rodney Uphoff, ConviaisgMe Inxacei:Aherraton
or SAeii Problan?, 2006 WIS. L REV. 739, 741-42 (describing assistance of counsel as often involving
"little more than counsel's help in facilitating a guilty plea").
250. For defense attorney incentives in our system that militate in favor of performing the "minimum amount necessary to convince clients to plead guilty as quickly as possible," see Tigran W. Eldred,
Pres owfor E6/ Bkhxdmw bpro g AAdwqfor Idgent Doxda M Criidsa Cases, 65 RUTGERS L REV.
333,351 (2012).
251. See Peter A. Joy, R s
tiJsev
by Rationing LAm, 37 WASHL U. JJ. & POL'Y 205, 215-16
(2011) ("The Strkand standard and the 'guilty anyway' syndrome combine to produce a criminal justice
system that accepts excessive caseloads resulting in poor lawyering.").
252. See Eldred, sspm note 250, at 335 ('[Ulnderfunded and overworked public defenders 'are constantly forced to violate their oaths as attorneys because their caseloads make it impossible for them to
practice law as they are required to do according to the profession's rules. They cannot interview their
clients properly, effectively seek their pretrial release, file appropriate motions, conduct necessary fact investigations, negotiate responsibly with the prosecutor, adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless
other tasks that normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with sufficient time and resources."' (quoting
NA'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf)); Irene
Oritseweyinmi Joe, S.mai,,g Pub& D'enderRadonig 93 DENv. L REV. 389, 396 (2016).
253. Forman, n"en note 248.
254. See Jodi F. Bouer & Elizabeth Ortecho, Book Review, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 377, 378 (1996)
(' Rothwax does not view the defense attorney's role as any better than the defendant's since she also serves
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255
Who wants to fund smoke and mirrors?
To the extent that problems exist with defense lawyering that are within
defense attorneys' power to ameliorate, the fusion may again have some explanatory weight. Thus, Abbe Smith finds that attorneys' assumptions of guilt
underlie "the bad lawyering at the root of many wrongful convictions: feckless

or beleaguered lawyers feeling that their client is guilty anyway, so what the
hell?"2s6
A final example concerns the very provision of defense counsel. To some,
the failure to provide defense counsel at stages of the criminal process that
include arraignment2y7 -and during the guilty ple process that arraignment
may encompass 2 5 8-is a disgrace. 25 9 But those who fuse arrest with guilt may
26
reject the idea that defense counsel needs to be provided at such points. W
And, where defense counsel is provided, those who fuse arrest and guilt may
view the model of "meet 'em and plead 'em" not as a monstrosity but rather

to prevent, distort, and mislead the court from discovering the truth, ie., her clients guilt.") (reviewing
JUDGE HAROLDJ. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OFTHE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM (1996)).
255. See Michael J. Minerva, Letter, Coma Fxd by THE FM. BAR, SEPTEMBER 1, 2008 LETrERS
(2008), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/letters-28/ ("Sen. Victor Crist, R-Tampa, decries.
the proposed moratorium [by public defenders on taking new cases, as a response to a funding crisis] as
grandstanding, saying along the way that most defendants are guilty anyway. No wonder public defenders
lack adequate funds when that highly placed legislator has such an outlandish view of the defense function.'); Raeder et a, mpra note 238, at 19 ('Governments thus view defense services as perhaps necessary
evils, but evils nevertheless, leading to cost control as the bureaucracy's overriding concern. After all, [the
logic appears to go,] why pay high fees to protect the guilty?"); John P. Gross & Jerry J. Cox, The Cat o
Repnhentasion Comfpared o te Cat qflItmmao, CHAMPION, Mar. 2013, at 22, 22 ("The reluctance to adequately fund indigent defense is undoubtedly based on an unwillingness to spend money on attorneys to
represent defendants who are perceived as most likely guilty. Providing defendants with representation is
therefore seen as a waste of money-, attorneys will only delay the inevitable and will make the criminal justice system less efficient.'). SeegeraU4 Murphy, nspna note 243.
Abe Inan256. Abbe Smith, In Praise ofte Guil#y Projet A CrwinalDfomue LAyer's GrowingAd
note 111, at 1020
ne Pmjet, 13 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 327 (2009); s also Rapping, DObM
('Mflhrough their subconscious assumptions about their clients, what the evidence against them means, and

what consequences are appropriate, defenders can be pushed to accept a lower standard of justice, and to
fight a little less aggressively, for their clients of color.").
257. See Packer, nra note 42, at 51 ("The assistance of counsel, to the extent that it is available at
arraignment, is perfunctory in the majority of cases. Waiver is easily accomplished and widespread.").
258. Se id at 48; c. Douglas L. Colbert, Prmsewin WIbotwd Rspm AnMon, 59 BUFF. L REV. 333, 38788 (2011).
259. See, eg., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWnTz ET AL, NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMtNAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR,
CRIMES, MAssIVE WAsra

THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AlMERiCA's BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 17

(2009).
260. See Packer, nra note 42, at 48 ('[According to the Crime Control Model,] [t]he general run of
criminal defendants are capable of making up their own minds as to whether they want to plead guilty. If a
defendant has a lawyer and wants to consult him about the guilty plea, that is proper. But the state should
be under no obligation to provide counsel for a defendant at arraignment All that is required fur a plea of
guilty is that the defendant understand its nature and consequences in a general kind of way, and that he
enter it of his own free wilL The judge's duty is to ensure that these conditions are met. It would involve a
needless duplication of resources to insist that a defense lawyer as well as a judge must participate in the
entry of a guilty plea.'; id at 61 ('The criminal process as it actually operates in the large majority of cases
probably approximates fairly closely the dictates of the Crime Control Model.').
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as an efficient way of proceeding.26' The phrase nicely encapsulates a system
in which the period between arrest and adjudication is largely seen as pointless
filler, 262 and thus one in which a lack of funding and support for vigorous defense becomes understandable.
B. PrvadiudicationSoffring
Preadjudication practices, such as bail, seem finally to be getting broad
recognition as practices that not only resemble the "punishment" that is for.bidden in advance of conviction but specifically punishment for the crime of
poverty.263 But it took a long time.264
If one is searching for explanations of how preadjudication practices of
this nature have gone on so long and to such adverse effect,265 it may again be

worth considering the assumptions of guilt attaching to those arrested. Jeffrey
Manns, for example, notes that the "conventional wisdom of the culpability of
anyone that the government has probable cause to arrest goes far towards
explaining popular apathy to pretrial detentions and the dearth of remedies for
detainees who are not convicted." 266 This apathy makes sense if, as KA. Duff
suggests, "the defendant is seen as being in fact an offender, who awaits only
the formal verdict of the court before receiving the punishment he deserves." 267 And indeed, if punishment is deserved, one might as well get started as soon as possible,268 something that our system permits by folding "time

261.

For the notion that the criminal justice system in America is "plagued bya... 'meet 'em and

plead 'em' methodology," see Lahny R. Silva, Riot to Comd and Pka Bargiah
99 IOWA L REV. 2219, 2230 (2014) (footnote omitted).
262. See Meyn, hupra note 246, at 725-26.

263.

Gideon's Liagq ConAnw,

See, ag.,
Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Powty's PunimestAsfemia's Oppmuiv Baii Regimi AM. PROSPECr

(Nov. 18, 2016), https://prospeitorg/ardcle/poverty% E2/o8O

o99s-purishment-ameicaE2%80/o99s-o

ppressive-bail-regime.
264. See Lauryn P. Gouldin, DiustarsliqFlight
Ritkfiwe Dax~gerame, 2016 BYU L REV. 837, 83940.

265. See Simonson, eapra note 89, at 608 ("Even a few days in jail are profoundly destabilizing, defendants experience declines in physical and mental health, and potentially lose wages, jobs, stable housing,
and custody of their children.').
266. Jeffrey Manns, Libe" Taking: A Fraewkfor CAipwA PrtialDeaiu,26 CARDOZO L
REV. 1947, 1956 (2005).
267. Duff, spranote 128, at 120 (adding that "that is why it is so easy (and so revealing) to slide into
talking about the danger that the defendant will commit, not ['offenses,] but 'further offen[sies' while on

bail").
.

268.

See id at 119 ('Now pre-trial detention is not (formally) punishment; it does not presuppose

that the defendant is guilty of the rme for which he is to be tried (although if the defendant is convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment, time spent on pre-trial remand can be counted towards that sentence as
'time served')."); Packer, mpr note 42, at 39 ('[Under the Crime Control Model,] [t]he vast majority of

persons chargedwith crime are factualy guilty[,]... [and]
Ifor all practical purpos,

the defendant is a

criminal Just because the assembly line cannot move fast enough for him to be immediately disposed of is

no reason for him to go free. If he does go free, he may not appear for trial, a risk that is heightened when
he has a strong consciousness of guilt and a lively expectation of probable punishment").
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served" into the formal sentence. 269 As Human Rights Watch puts it, "[t]he
time in pretrial detention (as well as in police lockup pre-arraignment)" can
'270
serve as "punishment paid in advance.
A lack of concern about pretrial custody has ripple effects. Part of what
justifies speedy trial guarantees is that a limit on the time spent to bring a case
to trial necessarily means a temporal limit on pretrial custody.271 If those held
in custody are assumed to be guilty, then we can see an explanation for the
widespread failure to make speedy trial guarantees meaningful.272 Similarly,
while one might be concerned that pretrial custody helps to bring about
pleas, 273 if one assumes that those in custody are guilty, then that may appear
to be not coercion but welcome efficiency. 274
C. Polce Rform
If the kinds of assumptions mentioned in this Artide-that arrests are
tantamount to guilt, that police are truthful, and that police are essential as the
primary mechanism for bringing the guilty to light--are indeed widespread,
then it may be unsurprising how halting reform has been of policing problems, including racially disparate policing and arrests,2 75 widespread use of
7
police untruth,2 78 and the incenarrest,276 inappropriate incentives to arrest,2 m

269. SeeDuf& ra note 128, at 119.
270.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRIcE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENION OF

LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 30 (2010), htps://www.hrw.org/sites

/usl2l1webwcove_O.pdf.
/default/files/repoe
271. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
Benjamin Weiser & James C. McKinley Jr., Chroni Bronx Cort Dday Dmy Defdats
272. S, ag.,
Dm Proau,Sit Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https://wwwmytimes.com/2016/05/11/nyregion/chroni
c-bronx-court-delays-deny-defendants-due-process-suit-says.htmL

273. See Packer, nom note 42, at 39-40.
274.

Se idat 38 ("[A] decision that the defendant will remain in custody once he has been charged

may itself induce him to plead guilty, thereby short-circuiting the part of the process concerned with guilt
determination and moving directly to the question of ultimate disposition.'); id at 39-40 (explaining the
antipathy of the "Crime Control Model" to reducing the rate of pretrial confinement: "The main risk is that
the increased consumption of time required to litigate cases that do not really need to be litigated would put
an intolerable strain on what is already an overburdened process. That consideration alone argues against a
policy that makes pretrial liberty the norm.").
' Anmrt Deddoau,
275. Se Tammy Rinehart Kochel et aL, Efft of Smp'd Rae on Offtj
49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 498 (2011) (using a meta-analysis to reach the conclusion that, "[o]n average, the
chances of a minority suspect being arrested were found to be 30 percent greater than a White suspect");
w & Pre&Ii of Readdw, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 167, 173 (2014)
Michael Tonry, Ir' and EAkwlraI
("Black men are arrested at younger ages and more often than white men for reasons that have as much to
do with racially differentiated exercises of police discretion as with racial differences in offending behavior.
Racial profiling by the police targets blacks and Hispanics and exposes them proportionately more often
than whites to arrest. Police drug enforcement policies target substances that black drug dealers sell and
places where they sell them, resulting in rates of arrests for drug offenses that have been four to six times
higher for blacks than for whites since the mid-1980s.').
276. Sn £spma
note 1 and accompanying text.

277. See sranotes 23-31 and accompanying text
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ives and culture that may encourage that untruth.279 If arrests are seen as tantamount to guilt, then those who bear the burden of making arrests--and
thus of taking control of criminal wrongdoers--are likely to garner esteem
and protection. The fusion of arrest and guilt thus may act as an obstacle to
reform. Judges, for example, play a role in overseeing police conduct and testimony. But Rodney Uphoff and others have suggested that judicial assump-

tions of guilt may dilute that power80
This Artide also suggests that traveling along with an assumption that an
arrest equals guilt is an assumption that a lack of arrest equals a lack of guilt. 81
(It can be hard to make much sense of "recidivism rates" that rely on arrests,
or "crime rates" that rely on arrest rates,282 unless this second assumption is in

278. See npra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
279. See, eg., Alexander, nmpra note 27.
280. See RodneyJ. Uphoff, On Miughig and Its LaplkationsfirCriminalD~dnt,Their Lwyrs and the
CiminalJsieSyAstem, 7 NEV. L.j. 521,543--44 (2007) ('In my view, the attitudinal blinders that many judges
possess contribute significantly to the inadequacies of the criminal justice system. Most judges, especially
those with prosecutotial experience, presume that most defendants are, in fact, guilty, even though some
are, in fact, innocent This presumption of guilt, pro-prosecution perspective not only affects the manner in
which many judges rule-on motions, evaluate witnesses, and exercise their discretion, but it also adversely
affects the willingness of many judges to police law enforcement agents and prosecutors. Judges tolerate
sloppy police work because they do not want to be viewed as micro-managing the police. Judicial reluctance
to let the guilty go free has meant a decreased use of the exclusionary rule. Similarly, courts are hesitant to
dismiss cases because of Brady violations or take other steps to reign in [sic] prosecutorial misconduct.
Finally, even when courts find error, too many errors are deemed harmless. The expanded use of harmless
error not only allows questionable verdicts to stand, it does little to discourage misconduct and sloppy
practices in the administration of justice." (footnotes omitted)); Bowers, supra note 22, at 1163 ('ihere
are
strong reasons to doubt the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in policing the police. Judges are especially
loath to discredit even incredible police testimony if it means razing evidence against defendants--especially recidivist defendants--whom judges may already believe are wasting judicial resources by not plea
bargaining."); Andrew E. Tasli z, SAun No Mol."The Iwfpkatf oftbe I
,fomed
Ci'
IdaforDiw v Before
Fomth Amndme Suppen Hearins,15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 764 (1999) (suggesting that the fact that
"many judges believe that most defendants are guilty" provides one of five reasons why judges are "all too

-wing to ignore police perjury").
281. Cf., el., Petersilia, spranote 91, at 382 ('[qriminal activity in the general population is assumed
to be relatively rare.').
282. See Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitua Offinder Statt and Crimnal Dew, 34
CONN. L REV. 55, 60 (2001) ("[W]e have no direct measure of the crime rate, but must rely on either the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports (9UCR") or the National Crime Victimization
Surveys ("NCVS'). The UCR only shows reported crimes and the NCVS is dependent upon the memory
of the individuals surveyed and the method of questioning."); Jerome G. Miller, Fmm Sodal Safe
to
jy N
Dragne Afiian America Males i the CrimimdJmti System, 51 WASIL & LEE L REV. 479, 481 (1994)
C(Meanwhile, the FBI Umfirm Crhm Repts (UCR), upon which the media routinely base their official estimates of crime, inflated both the numbers and the seriousness of the types of incidents reported. Whereas
most European nations report their crime statistics on the basis of convictions, the UCR reports are based
on complaints or arrests. However, about thirty-eight of every one hundred individuals arrested for a felony
tither were not prosecuted or had their cases dismissed outright at their first court appearances. This had
nothing to do with plea bargains; usually there was not sufficient reason to proceed with the cases."' (footnote omitted)). For spillover effects of these choices, see, for example, Tess Owen & Isabella McKinley
Corbo, When Cops Commit Crm : Inside the Frst Datahae that Tracks America's Criminal Cops, VICE NEWS
(Sept. 12, 2017), https//news.vice.com/story/poliec-crime-database, for a discussion of the use of police
arrests to populate a database of police "crime": "We should also bear in mind that an arrest is not equivalent to a conviction. Just as with the general population, officers are presumed innocent until proven guilty.
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play.2 ) This second assumption may serve to insulate the police from concers about disparate enforcement, since it may mean that potential concern
aboutfailure to arrest is diluted,28 4 just as is potential concern about decisions to
arrest.
D. ProsecutorialReform
Commentators frequently lament a widespread failure by prosecutors to
put much meaning into their constitutional and ethical mandate to "do justice." 285 This mandate all too often seems to be interpreted as a mandate to
score convictions-in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's indication
in Berger v. United States that the interest of the prosecution "is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done."286 Paul Butler describes this statement, in the current system, as "just words on paper"; 28 7 others despair of the
idea that the "do justice" mandate can ever be made meaningfuLm One
would need, for example, to set up an appropriate incentive system for prosecutors, and that has not yet been done.28 9
An assumption regarding the guilt of those arrested may help elucidate
some of these failures. 29° If those arrested are assumed to be guilty, then (for

But Stinson [the creator of a 'police crime database] thinks looking at arrests is a fair way to examine cop

crime, because that's how law enforcement (including the FBI's Uniform Crime Report) collects informarion on crime in general" Id
283. See Anna Roberts, Impeach et blyUm&bk Comidiox, 55 B.C. L REV. 563 (2014) (discussing the
question of whether a criminal record is not just a reliable indicator of culpability but also a reliable indicator of reatiw culpability).
and Tahl, 95 N.C. L REV. 1241, 1252-54 (2017) (dis284. See I. Bennett Capers, Ra, Po0iA
cussing "underenforcement"); see also I. Bennett Capers, The Undar-Poka, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589
(2016).

285. See AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION S 31.2(b) (4th ed. 2015), https://www.americanar.og/groups/cdminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunct
ionFourthEdition/ ("The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law,
not merely to convict").
286. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
287. Paul Butler, Opinion, Gideon's Aiied Tmxpet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2013), https://www.nytim
es.com/2013/03/18/opinion/gideons-muted-trumpet.htmL
288. See, ag., State v. Stardsh, 544 P.2d 1, 9 (Wash. 1975) (Utter, J., dissenting).
Offix, 31 CARDOZO L REV.
289. See Rachel E. Barkow, Opvir'afionx GddeAie, for the Pm smdelr
2089, 2091 (2010) ("[qonvictions are the lodestar by which prosecutors tend to be judged.'); Andrew D.
Leipold, The Probkm 0fthe Imm4 Acquiltd Dondant,94 NW. U. L REV. 1297,1328 (2000) ("[Even in the

absence of bad faith prosecutors have incentives to resolve nagging doubts about a suspect's guilt in favor
of prosecution."); Siegel, mpra note 245, at 1225 (noting "the failure of our system to develop an incentive
structure for prosecutors that rewards the pursuit of justice rather than the pursuit of competitive advantage").
290. See HuMAN RIGHS WATCH, mpra note 270, at 31 (quoting Timothy Murray, then-Executive
Director of the Pretrial Justice Institute, as saying that woven into the mindset of prosecutors across this
country is "the idea [that] you should somehow 'pay' from the moment of arrest, that you owe the system
something just by virtue of being accused... because they implicitly believe-and must believe--that
people who are arrested are guilty").

2019]

Amsts As Git12

1029

those who believe that guilt should be met with a conviction) justice might
well be seen as identical to the pursuit of convictions, and incentives that further that pursuit might be seen as beneficial In addition, if those arrested are
assumed to be guilty, then concerns about prosecutorial misconduct are likely
to lessen, given the tendency to worry less about misconduct when its victim
291
is thought to be guilty.

Judges have a potential role in overseeing aspects of the prosecutorial role
and curbing its worst excesses. 292 But if they too are liable to fuse arrest with
guilt, their relative inaction may make more sense.2 93 Prosecutors, in turn,
have a potential role in overseeing aspects of police conduct, screening its
output, 294 and curbing its worst excesses.295 If they are liable to fuse arrest
with guilt,2 96 their relative failure to play this role may make more sense.297
CONCLUSION
Criminal justice reform is hard. However strong one's commitment, one
faces obvious barriers, whether fear, financing, or resistance to change. This
Article has brought to light a less obvious barrier: a widespread fusion of arrest and guilt. If even those committed to criminal justice reform are vulnerable to this fusion, the slowness of reform in areas that rely on a robust understanding of the distinction between arrest and guilt may make more sense.
Yet criminal justice reform is crucial. If, as this Article suggests, the fusion
of arrest and guilt is indeed a potent force, we must investigate its many pos-

291. See Balko, Jspra note 235 (We want to punish criminals. We want them to suffer. We create
hostile prison environments rife with violence, racial resentment and rape."').
292.

See, e.g., Roberts, opra note 67, at 331 (suggesting.that judicial power to monitor and regulate

prosecutorial conduct is greater than commonly suggested).
293. See Uphoff, ntm note 280, at 543-44, 544 n.129 ("Many commentators have highlighted the
serious systemic problem of prosecutoial misconduct and criticized judicial inattention to the problem .... ').
294. Sn NYU Sch. of Law, New Frontienin Ram and CrimsinalJfsti - Patd 2: Race and Prsaihon,

YOUrUBE 29:58-31:07 (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qUtgqDaJN.g#t=29m58s
(showing Whitney Tymas saying. "[Prosecutors need to understand the real leadership that they can exercise when it comes to not endorsing all police action.... [les really okay to tell a police officer, 'I'm not...
prosecuting this case.'.. . [P]rosecutors can say no and.., not just be case processors-really be leaders . .. 1
295. See i
296. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Dak Pmwwdal Rasirtatue to Port-Comvt'on Claims of Inromc, 84
B.U. L REV. 125, 140 (2004) (CTheperception, even among prosecutors, that the police only arrest guilty
people in the first place reinforces the belief that the right person was charged and later convicted.").
297. See Natapoff, stpra note 20, at 1068 (With respect to minor offenses,... prosecutors in some
jurisdictions forgo the screening inquiry and convert arrests into charges more or less automatically. This
fact is reflected in low rates at which prosecutors decline cases. In New York and Iowa, for example, Josh
Bowers found declination rates for certain minor offenses as low as 2M/o
or less, meaning that 98% of those
police arrest decisions converted to criminal charges. A Vera Institute study found similarly low prosecutorial declination rates in misdemeanor drug cases in North Carolina." (footnote omitted)).
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sible explanations. Identifying the fusion, and attempting to understand it, is a
necessary precursor to efforts to combat it.

